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Abstract 
Previous research has shown that people’s willingness to help those in need is influenced 
by a multitude of factors (e.g., perceived dangerousness of a situation, cost-benefit 
analysis, attributions of responsibility, kinship, status, and culture). However, past 
research has often focused on single factors to predict helping intentions. Therefore, the 
present thesis examines the interplay of different factors in order to predict helping 
intentions in the most accurate and effective way. 
 The present thesis provides an encompassing review of the bystander literature. 
Furthermore, a series of three studies examined whether helping intentions can be 
predicted by an interplay between perceptions of a victim’s responsibility for their plight; 
the type of helping behavior; and the relationship between the helper and the victim. The 
results show that individuals are more willing to help victims perceived as being innocent 
for their plight, but only in low-danger situations. In more dangerous scenarios, people’s 
willingness to intervene increases with the level of perceived danger, regardless of 
responsibility attributions. This effect is partly driven by people’s accepted costs for 
helping the person in need. However, only marginal effects for kinship were observed. 
 Moreover, recent research has demonstrated that it is not sufficient to put the 
focus only on the binary decision to provide help, or not. Thus, the present thesis 
investigated whether a help seeker’s status affects the type of help (i.e., dependency- or 
autonomy-oriented) differently in different cultures. The results of three studies showed 
that help seekers’ status affected the type of provided help in highly individualistic 
cultures. This effect on help type also occurred in the middle of the individualistic-
collectivistic continuum, whereas no such effect occurred in collectivistic cultures. 
Theoretical and practical implications for helping behavior are discussed.  
 
 
 
To help, or not to help, that is not the only question: 
An investigation of the interplay of different factors to predict 
helping behavior  in an accurate and effective way. 
 
 
 
1. General Introduction 
Imagine the following three situations to set the stage for the purpose of the present 
thesis. First, it has been a long day of work and to get back home you have to take a bus. 
You are standing alone at a bus station. While you are waiting for the bus you are listing to 
music on your mp3 player to make your waiting more pleasant. While you are waiting 
there, a group of male teenagers arrive. The group is giggling and making jokes with one 
another. Suddenly, two of them start to push each other. How would you react in this 
situation? Do you think that you would react differently if there were nine other people at 
the bus station?  
Second, it is a Saturday afternoon and you are a reading a book on your couch. 
Suddenly, your telephone rings. When you answer the phone, you recognize the sorrowful 
voice of an acquaintance. Your acquaintance is seeking consolation after he or she has 
been left by his or her partner. During the conversation your acquaintance mentions that 
his or her former partner fell in love with another person. Therefore, it was impossible for 
the partner to keep up the original relationship. Would you help your acquaintance in this 
situation? If yes, do you think that you would also help if your acquaintance told you that 
he or she had betrayed his or her former partner several times without any feelings of 
remorse? 
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Third, you are at work. You are taking a break to grab a coffee in the social room. 
In the social room you have a little chat with one of your colleagues. While you are on 
your way back to your workplace your department head approaches you in the hallway. 
The department head asks you whether you could help him or her out to do some advanced 
statistical analyses. Would you help the department head? If yes, would you just do the 
analysis for your department head, or would you rather show him or her how to do it? Do 
you think that you would react differently if a trainee asks you? 
These examples should illustrate three important questions which are inevitably 
connected with research on helping behavior. First, in the “bus stop” situation we have to 
raise the question: When do people help? Do people help more often if they face a situation 
alone, or if there are other people present? Or, do people do a cost-benefit analysis before 
they help? Second, connected to the “consolation” situation the question arises: Why do 
people help? Are people more willing to help others if the person in the plight is perceived 
as being innocent? Or, do people help close relatives more often than acquaintances? 
Third, the “statistical analyses problem” leads to the question: How do people help? Do 
people just provide the solution to a problem rather than providing the tools to get to the 
solution?  
These three questions are going to be answered in the following sections, but before 
answering these questions it has to be clarified what is meant by helping behavior, in 
general. Helping behavior can be broadly defined as an action that has the consequence of 
providing some benefit to or improving the well-being of another person (Dovidio, 
Piliavin, Schroeder, & Penner, 2006). Such actions can be: lending money for a bus ticket, 
pushing somebody’s car out of snow, setting up a date for a friend, cooking a meal for 
someone, lending a car, protecting someone from harassment, etc. As this diverse set of 
actions indicate, the definition of helping behavior is not stringent. Therefore, McGuire 
(1994) attempted to identify categories of helping behavior by asking people to list the 
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different kinds of help they had received from and given to friends, acquaintances, and 
strangers. McGuire’s results revealed four types of helping behavior: (a) casual helping 
(e.g., lending someone class notes, picking up items at a store, or giving money for the 
public transport), (b) substantial personal helping (e.g., cleaning up somebody’s house, 
covering for something, or helping to move out of town), (c) emotional helping (e.g., 
providing moral support, keeping someone company, or hugging somebody), and (d) 
emergency helping (e.g., taking somebody to the hospital, protecting someone from 
harassment, or offering help after an accident).  
 
1.1  When do people help? 
1.1.1 When costs can be minimized and rewards can be maximized 
From an economic point of view, people are motivated to help when they can 
maximize their rewards and minimize their costs (Epstein & Hornstein, 1969; Piliavin, 
Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981). This implies that people who are facing a potential 
helping situation first analyze the circumstances, then weigh the probable costs and 
rewards for helping, and based on this cost-reward analysis people will base their decision 
whether to help, or not. Costs can be categorized into those for helping, and those for not 
helping (e.g., Dovidio et al., 2006). 
Costs for helping can be: (a) possible physical harm, (b) psychological aversion, (c) 
social disapproval, or (d) effort and time. Regarding possible physical harm, previous 
research showed that people are less willing to help others when they face a situation that 
is connected with potential physical costs (e.g., receiving an electrical shock) for helping 
and the costs for not helping are relatively small (e.g., Batson, O'Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, 
& Isen, 1983; Midlarsky & Midlarsky, 1973). Concerning psychological aversion, Piliavin 
and Piliavin (1972) staged an emergency in the subway. Their participants had either to 
observe a confederate who collapsed, or a confederate who collapsed and who was 
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bleeding at the same time. Given that many people have an aversion to blood, Piliavin and 
Piliavin found that 95% helped the non-bleeding person in need, whereas the helping rate 
dropped to 65% in the bleeding condition. Regarding social disapproval, past research 
showed that people who help members of a stigmatized group (e.g., handicapped people, 
overweight people, refugees, etc.) have to face slander (e.g., Hebl & Mannix, 2003). 
Moreover, Snyder, Omoto, & Crain (1999) found that people who do not volunteer for an 
AIDS organization fear that they will be stigmatized by other people. Concerning effort 
and time, Darley and Batson (1973) found that people helped a slumped person more often 
when they had no time pressure than when they did.  
Rewards for helping can be: (a) social rewards, or (b) monetary compensation. 
Regarding social rewards, previous research showed that people are more helpful if they 
anticipate that their actions can bring them recognition from others, increase their 
popularity, or maintain their good reputation (e.g., Deutsch & Lamberti, 1986; Fisher & 
Ackerman, 1998; Johnson, Erez, Kiker, & Motowidlo, 2002). Moreover, McGovern, 
Ditzian, and Taylor (1975) found that a simple “thank you” can increase helping rates. 
Grant and Gino (2010) found that this effect is mediated by increased feelings of being 
valued by others. Regarding monetary compensation, past research showed people who 
expect monetary rewards have an increased helping rate (Wilson & Kahn, 1975). 
Costs for not helping a person in need can be: (a) harm for the person in need, (b) 
guilt or blame, and (c) unpleasant arousal. Past research showed that the harm for a person 
in need can be tremendous if he or she will not receive help (i.e., in emergency helping 
situations); in the worst case the person in need could die due to non-intervention (e.g., 
Latané & Darley, 1970). As a consequence, people are more helpful if the costs for not 
helping in person in need is high. For example, Fischer, Greitemeyer, Pollozek, and Frey 
(2006) found that people are more willing to help a person in need when the person was 
attacked by a fierce looking perpetrator, as compared to an attack by a slight looking 
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perpetrator. Concerning feelings of unpleasant arousal, Dovidio, Piliavin, Gaertner, 
Schroeder, and Clark (1991) found that people who observe a person in distress develop an 
increased feeling of unpleasantness, and as a consequence people have a greater motivation 
to help (for detailed discussion of the arousal: cost-reward model see chapter: 1.2.1) 
 
1.1.2 When people are related to the person in need  
From an evolutionary, to be more specific, from a kin selection theory point of view 
people provide more help to others with whom they are genetically related (e.g., Curry, 
1988; Laham, Gonsalkorale, & von Hippel, 2005). Furthermore, there is also evidence 
from cross-cultural studies which showed that people provide more help to relatives (i.e., 
close relatives), than to nonrelatives (e.g., Essock-Vitale & McGuire, 1985; Euler, Hoier, 
& Rohde, 2001). 
Moreover, Burnstein, Crandall, and Kitayama (1994) asked their participants 
whether they would help a person either in an “every day” or in a “life-or-death” situation. 
Additionally, they systematically varied the genetic relatedness between participants and 
the persons in need. What they found is that their participants offered more help to persons 
the more closely related they were, independent of the helping situation. To be more 
specific, siblings were more likely to be offered help than cousins, and cousins were more 
likely to be offered help than unrelated friends. However, the used scenarios by Burnstein 
et al. are ambiguous with regard to McGuire’s (1994) taxonomy. The “every day” 
situations can be categorized as both casual helping and substantial personal helping, 
whereas the “life-or-death” situations can be categorized as emergency helping.  
From a social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978) and from a self-categorization theory 
point view (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), people are more helpful to 
in-group members than to out-group members (e.g., Allen, Sargent, & Bradley, 2003; 
Levine, Cassidy, Brazier, & Reicher, 2002; Levine & Crowther, 2008). For example, 
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Levine, Prosser, Evans, and Reicher (2005) invited their participants to answer some 
questions about their preferred soccer team to activate group membership (i.e., being a 
supporter of your favorite soccer team). Subsequent to the group membership activation, 
the participants were informed that they have to walk to a nearby building to watch a 
videotaped soccer match. On the way to the nearby building, the participants came across a 
person who was obviously injured. The participants either came across a victim who wore 
a shirt of the preferred soccer team (in-group condition), or a shirt of a rivaling team (out-
group condition), or a neutral sport shirt (control condition). Levine et al. found that people 
helped the in-group victim more often than the out-group and the control condition.  
 
1.1.3 When other people are present  
If you think of the “bus stop” scenario again, bystander literature (e.g., Fischer et 
al., 2011; Darley & Latané, 1970, Latané & Nida, 1981) would predict that people who are 
alone at the bus stop should intervene more often than those who are there with nine other 
bystanders. However, there is also evidence that the presence of bystanders can reduce, or 
even reverse the bystander effect. This effect can especially observed in emergency 
helping situations (e.g. Fischer et al., 2006, 2011; Fischer & Greitemeyer, 2013).  
Given that the bystander effect is one of most-cited effects in introductory 
psychology textbooks (Griggs & Proctor, 2002), Chapter 2 of this thesis will provide an 
encompassing review of the bystander literature to clarify questions under which 
conditions the presence of bystanders increase the willingness to help, and under which the 
bystander effect is reduced, vanishes, or even reverses. 
 
1.2. Why do people help? 
1.2.1 If an unpleasant arousal has to be decreased 
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Piliavin et al.’s (1981) arousal: cost reward-model predicts that people are more 
willing to help if they feel an arousal. To be more specific, the arousal: cost-reward model 
proposes that people develop empathic arousal from witnessing another person’s distress. 
If people attribute their empathic arousal to a person in need’s distress, they will feel an 
unpleasant emotional arousal. As a consequence people are willing to reduce this 
unpleasant arousal. An effective way to reduce the unpleasant arousal is to help the 
distressed person (Dovidio et al., 1991). Empirical evidence for these propositions will be 
provided in the following paragraphs.  
According to Eisenberg and Fabes (1991) there is substantial evidence that people 
are responsive to others’ distress. For example, Vaughan and Lanzetta (1980) found that 
the observation of a person who reacted with strong facial distress to electrical shocks lead 
to an increased unpleasant physical arousal. Moreover, Vaughan and Lanzetta’s 
participants also reacted with similar facial expression as the distressed person. There is 
also evidence that even newborns (one- and two-day old) respond to the distress of other 
newborns (Simner, 1971). 
 There is also empirical evidence that empathic arousal which is attributed to the 
person in need’s distress fosters helping behavior. For example, Gaernter and Dovidio 
(1977) measured their participants’ heart rate while they witnessed a staged emergency 
(i.e., a stack of chairs falling on a confederate). In line with the predictions of the arousal: 
cost-reward model, they found that participants who were more aroused (i.e., had a higher 
heart rate) helped the confederate more often rather than those who had a lower heart rate. 
Moreover, Gaernter and Dovidio (1977) also revealed that participants who misattributed 
their arousal to something else (i.e., the effect of a pill) were less willing to help a 
confederate in a similar emergency scenario as mentioned before. 55% of the participants 
who were informed that the effect of a pill is an increased arousal (misattribution 
condition) helped the confederate, whereas the helping rate of those who were informed 
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that the pill will not arouse them was 85%. However, there is also evidence that 
misattribution can lead to more helpfulness. Previous research showed that arousal from a 
wide range of sources (e.g., exercises, fear, erotic films, etc.) leads to increased helping 
rates when the arousal is attributed to the need of a person in a plight (e.g., Mueller & 
Donnerstein, 1981; Mueller, Donnerstein, & Hallam, 1983; Sterling & Gaertner, 1984). 
 
1.2.2 If the person in need is perceived as being ‘innocent”  
From an attribution theory point of view, a person in need receives help more often 
if he or she is perceived as being ‘innocent’ (Weiner, 1980, 1996) for his or her plight. If 
you think of the “consolation” scenario again, people should provide less emotional 
support if the person who calls had betrayed his or her former partner. Past research on 
attribution theory showed that this phenomenon can be observed in different helping 
situation. One of the most frequent questions which has been investigated is, whether 
students are willing to lend their class notes to a fellow student (cf. Weiner, 1996). For 
example, Weiner (1980) found that students were less willing to lend their class notes to a 
fellow student if he had skipped class and went to the beach, whereas if the student needed 
the class notes due to an eye-problem, people were more willing to help. In other words, if 
people perceive the cause for being in a plight as uncontrollable, they are more willing to 
help. On the contrary, if the cause for being in a plight is perceived as controllable, 
people’s helping rates decrease.  
In line with Weiner’s findings, Meyer and Mulherin (1980) found that people are 
more willing to lend money if the requester could not control the reason for his or her 
plight, where if the requester could control the reason, he or she received less money. 
Moreover, Betancourt (1990) found that students received more support after a failure if 
they had been portrayed as innocent (e.g., student had an accident which resulted in 
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hospitalization and an inability to read), than those who were portrayed as responsible for 
their plight (e.g., going out of town with friends to have fun). 
 
1.2.3 If people live in a “helpful” culture 
Previous research on helping behavior showed that the question why people help 
can be answered by cultural determinants (e.g., Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Henrich et al., 
2005; Knafo, Schwartz, & R. Levine, 2009; R. Levine, Moghaddam, Taylor, & Wright, 
1993; Norenzayan, & Philbrick, 2001). For example, Moghaddam, Taylor, and Wright 
(1993) showed that people in collectivistic societies are more helpful to their in-group 
members than those people who live in an individualistic society.  
However, Knafo, Schwartz, and R. Levine (2009) found that strangers received less 
help in highly embedded cultures. This finding can be explained in a way that people who 
live in a highly embedded culture focus predominately on in-group members’ welfare, 
therefore embedded cultures show little concern for the wellbeing of out-groups (Knafo et 
al., 2009). As a consequence, the more embedded a culture is, the less people are willing to 
help strangers.  
Furthermore, a field study by R. Levine, Norenzayan, and Philbrick (2001) revealed 
that the tendency to help strangers varied across countries from very high rates of 93% in 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and 81% in Vienna, Austria; to low rates of 45% in New York, 
United States; and 40% in Kuala Lampur, Malaysia. This trend could be observed across 
different helping situations, such as returning an accidently dropped pen, helping a 
handicapped person to pick accidently dropped magazines, or helping a blind person to 
cross the street. However, R. Levine et al. (2001) could not observe a clear cultural or 
geographic trend in helping strangers in need. To be more specific, they found a very 
diverse pattern for the most helpful places (e.g., Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Calcutta, India; or 
General Introduction   18  
Vienna, Austria) and the least helpful places (e.g., Sofia, Bulgaria; Amsterdam, 
Netherlands; or Kuala Lampur; Malaysia), respectively.  
 
1.3. How do people help?  
If you think of the “statistical problem” situation, people have basically three ways 
to respond to the help request. First, someone could simple say: “No, I’m not going to help 
you”. Second, somebody could reply in a way: “Sure, I’ll help you. You just have to enter 
the following commands”. Third, your colleague could react: “Of course, I’ll help you. 
You have use this command to get the mediation analysis. The output that you get consists 
of the parts A, B, and C. A provides the information of the overall effect. This effect is 
based on an OLS regression, therefore, you have to …”. The second way of responding to 
the help request is a perfect example for dependency-oriented help, whereas the third 
response is an example for autonomy-oriented help. According to Nadler (1997, 1998, 
2002) dependency-oriented help consists in giving the solution to a problem, whereas 
autonomy-oriented help consists in providing the tools with which a recipient is able to 
solve his or her problem by himself or herself. If someone provides dependency-oriented 
help, this reflects the helper’s view that the recipient lacks the competence to solve a 
problem by himself or herself. However, if a helper provides autonomy-oriented help, 
assesses the recipient as capable to solve problem on their own when they receive the 
appropriate tools (Brickman et al., 1982). But what are the consequences of receiving 
dependency-oriented and autonomy-oriented help?  
Past research showed that people who ask for help and just receive dependency-
oriented help feel dependent and inferior in comparison to the help giver (Nadler, 1991; 
Nadler & Fisher, 1986). Moreover, if people receive help (i.e., dependency-oriented help) 
without a prior help-request they feel threatened in their freedom of actions, connected 
with adverse emotions of reactance.  
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Beyond people’s emotional reaction to dependency oriented help, Nadler and 
Chernyak-Hai (2014) found that people provide dependency-oriented help more often to 
help seekers with a lower status (e.g., having a lower IQ than the help-giver, being a 
kitchen hand), whereas people provide autonomy-oriented help to help seekers with a high 
status (e.g., having a higher IQ, or being a medical doctor). Their results imply that a help 
seeker with low status will remain at the same status, whereas a help seeker with a high 
stats will be able to increase its status, which in the long run leads to an increased 
inequality.  
 
1.4. Scope of the present thesis 
The present dissertation aims to provide a deeper understanding of the interplay of 
different factors to predict helping behavior in an accurate and effective way. To be more 
specific, the present thesis focuses on (a) the impact of present bystanders on the 
willingness to help, (b) the interplay between perceptions of a victim’s responsibility for 
their plight; the type of helping behavior; and the relationship between the helper and the 
victim on the readiness to help somebody who is a plight, and (c) the impact of a help 
seeker’s status on the kind of help he or she will receive in different cultures. 
According to Griggs and Proctor (2002), the bystander effect is one of the most 
cited phenomena in introductory psychological text books. Therefore, Chapter 2 of this 
thesis aims to provide an encompassing review of the bystander literature from Latané and 
Darley’s seminal investigations till current research. Chapter 2 especially focuses on 
clarifying under which conditions the bystander effect can be observed, why the effect 
sometimes reduces, and why the bystander effect can even reverse. 
The purpose of the studies in Chapter 3 is to investigate the interplay of perceived 
responsibility for being in a plight, the relationship between a helper and a victim, and the 
kind of helping situations. Study 3.1 aims to systematically investigate this interplay based 
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on McGuire’s (1994) taxonomy of different helping behaviors. Study 3.2 aims to partly 
replicate and to extend the findings of Study 3.1 by including a moral courage scenario. 
Finally, Study 3.3 aims to clarify the underlying psychological process (i.e., accepted costs 
for helping) that explains why people are willing to help others in more dangerous 
situations.  
Chapter 4 deals with the question whether a help seeker’s status differently affect 
the kind of help he or she will receive in different cultures (i.e., individualistic vs. 
collectivistic cultures). Study 4.1 aims to clarify the question what kind of help (i.e. 
dependency-oriented vs. autonomy-oriented) participants provide to help seekers in 
dependence of the help seekers’ status. Moreover, Study 4.1 is designed to examine 
whether this effect is influenced by participants’ cultural background (i.e. individualistic 
vs. collectivistic). Study 4.2 aims to replicate and to extend the findings of Study 4.1 by 
comparing a highly individualistic culture with a culture at the mid-level of individualism-
collectivism continuum. In Study 4.1 and 4.2 the help seeker’s status is manipulated via its 
profession. In the high status condition the participants will be informed that the help 
seeker is a medical doctor (Study 4.1 and 4.2), whereas in the low status condition the help 
seeker will be a craftsman (Study 4.1) or a kitchen hand (Study 4.2). Additionally, in Study 
4.3 the relative status difference between the help giver and help seeker will be kept 
constant via a fake IQ-test.  
The final chapter of this thesis (General Discussion) provides a summary of the 
results of the present research. These results are going to be discussed regarding their 
theoretical and practical implications. Moreover, the General Discussion chapter includes a 
discussion of the limitations of the present research in order to provide a potentially fruitful 
starting point for prospective research in the investigated field. 
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“The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil  
is for good men to do nothing.” (Edmund Burke) 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
First of all we have to clarify the question what is meant by bystander effect. 
Bystander effect is defined by an increased likelihood that individuals are less willing to 
intervene in critical situations the more other passive people are present (cf. Latané & 
Darley, 1970; Latané & Nida, 1981). The starting point for research on the bystander effect 
was the brutal rape-murder of Catherine “Kitty” Genovese in 1964. Kitty was stabbed to 
death in front of her apartment in Queens, New York, while 38 people of her neighborhood 
witnessed (from the safety of their apartments) this cruel event without taking neither 
active (e.g., trying to stop the perpetrator) nor passive (e.g., calling the police) action for 
approximately 40 minutes. After that brutal event, Latané and Darley (1970) developed 
their famous process model of help-giving.  
In short, their model assumes that a bystander who witnesses a case of emergency 
has to progress through five sequential steps before he or she will intervene. The model 
will be discussed in detail in the following sections. Latané and Darley (1970) argued that 
the witnesses failed to intervene because there were too many of them. Compare the 
following situation with Kitty’s case. In 2001, a group of young right-wing skinheads 
chased a young Greek man in Munich. Subsequently, they caught him and brutally beat 
him. Again, several individuals witnessed this case of emergency, yet only one young man 
from Turkey decided to take action. He pulled the blood-stained victim aside and saved his 
life by risking his own. In relation to these examples, the question is raised as to what 
factors affect bystanders to intervene in such situations, or not. For more than 45 years, 
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many studies have been conducted to answer this question. One of the most common and 
influential factors which effects the bystanders willingness to help is the number of 
individuals (so called bystanders) witnessing a case of emergency (Fischer et al., 2011; 
Latané & Nida, 1981). Classic results showed that the greater the number of bystanders, 
the less helping behavior is exhibited. However, some studies have revealed contradictory 
findings, especially more current ones (cf. Fischer et al., 2011). In this work we are trying 
to clarify these contracting results. Specifically, we are highlighting influential factors 
(e.g., Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, and Penner, 2006; Fischer, Greitemeyer, Pollozek, and 
Frey, 2006) which can reduce, or even reverse, typical bystander behavior. 
  
2.2 General Overviews 
The works cited in this section provide an encompassing overview of developments 
on bystander research over the past 45 years. The ground breaking publication of Latané 
and Darley´s (1970) process model of help-giving has influenced most of the following 
studies on bystander behavior. In most psychology text books, especially in social 
psychology (e.g., Dovidio et al., 2006), this model is found along with the narrative of 38 
witnesses in Kitty’s case. The number 38 became famous due to a newspaper article in the 
New York Times, although this number is still under dispute (Manning, Levine, & Collins, 
2007). In 1981, Latané and Nida published the first meta-analysis on bystander behavior, 
attempting to clarify contradicting results. For example, a study of Fischer and colleagues 
(2006) showed that the bystander effect occurred especially in non-dangerous emergency-
situations but not in dangerous emergency-situations. The meta-analysis of Fischer et al. 
(2011) offers some plausible explanations as to why the bystander effect in dangerous 
situations can be reduced or even reversed. 
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2.3 The Process Model of Help-Giving 
This section will highlight the five sequential steps that a bystander who witnesses 
an emergency has to progress through before he or she will intervene (Latané & Darley, 
1970). First of all, a critical situation must be noticed (Step 1). After noticing the situation, 
the bystander will then evaluate it as an emergency or non-emergency (Step 2). If a 
bystander has noticed a situation and has evaluated it as an emergency, he or she may then 
feel a personal sense of responsibility for taking action (Step 3: assumption of personal 
responsibility). If so, a bystander will then evaluate whether he or she has the appropriate 
skills to intervene (Step 4: perceived competencies). Finally, a conscious implementing 
decision will be made (Step 5: decisions to help). A bystander must pass each and every 
step sequentially; otherwise, he or she will fail to help.  
To carry the theoretical model over to a real life scenario, imagine following 
situation. You are standing at a bus station and listing to music on your mp3 player. Next 
to you there is group of male teenagers giggling and making jokes with one another. 
Suddenly, two of them start to push each other. According to the model, that means you 
should first recognize the situation (Step 1), although you are perhaps listing to your 
favorite song on your mp3 player. If you have noticed the event, you must then interpret it 
as being an emergency or not (Step 2). Maybe the two young men are pushing for fun. As 
you recognize that they are not (Step 3), the question then arises as to if you are personally 
responsible to intervene or not. Due to the circumstance that no one else is around, you are 
in charge. But before intervening you will then self-evaluate (Step 4) your intervention 
skills (e.g., deescalating communication strategies or physical power). Finally, you must 
then make the conscious decision (Step 5) to intervene or not. According to the given 
example, it is important to determine the psychological processes and/or factors that have 
specific influence on the individual’s final decision to take action in an emergency - or 
whether to ignore it.  
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2.4 Psychological Processes that prevent Bystanders from Intervention 
Research on bystander behavior has identified three psychological processes that 
can interrupt the five steps in the help-giving model. The first psychological process is 
called pluralistic ignorance (Latané & Darley, 1969, 1970; Latané & Nida, 1981), which 
results when bystanders are faced with an ambiguous situation that could being interpreted 
as an emergency or not. If other bystanders demonstrate no intention to take action, then 
people are less likely to interpret the ambiguous situation as an emergency. According to 
our example (on the assumption that more people are at the bus stop) this means that if you 
not sure whether the teenagers are pushing for fun or not, you will check the reaction of 
other individuals. When no one else shows the expression that it could be an emergency, 
you are unlikely to become active.  
The second process is called diffusion of responsibility (Latané & Darley, 1969; 
Latané & Nida, 1981); whereby the number of bystanders present during an emergency is 
inversely proportional to the personal responsibility each individual bystander experiences. 
In other words, as the number of witnesses rises, the likelihood of any specific individual 
deciding to intervene falls. Referring to our example, this implies that if you are alone at 
the bus stop, you have 100% responsibility to intervene. However, when nine others are 
present, you only have 10% of the responsibility.  
The third and final process is evaluation apprehension (Latané & Darley, 1970) 
which stems from the bystanders’ fear that acting in a public setting may potentially 
subject them to wide scrutiny if their behavior is deemed inadequate. Relating to our 
example this means that you are maybe afraid of acting wrongly in front of others (e.g., if 
you are not able to solve such an “easy to settle” situation you will be derided).  
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2.5 Influencing Factors 
According to the Latané and Nida’s (1981) and Fischer et al.’s (2011) meta-
analyses research on the bystander effect has identified several factors that affect a 
bystander whether he or she will intervene, or not. The following sections focus on the 
impact of the present number of bystanders in a case of emergency, the dangerousness of 
an emergency, and the belongingness to a social category. 
 
2.5.1 Number of Bystanders 
The bystander effect is based on the assumption that the more passive the 
bystanders are witnessing a critical situation, the less intervention will follow (cf. Fischer 
et al., 2011; Latané & Nida, 1981) – a phenomenon that can be observed in the field (lit), 
in artificial situatons (e.g., in the lab, lit), and in virtual reality environments (e.g., Kozlov 
& Johansen, 2010). Moreover, even young children show typical bystander behavior in 
helping situations (Plötner, Over, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2015). 
In their seminal study, Latané and Darley’s (1968) participants were asked to 
discuss “some of the problems involved in a live at an urban university”. When they 
arrived, they were led to a waiting room to fill out preliminary questionnaires. While the 
participants were working on their questionnaires, the room was purposely filled with 
smoke. The participants were then faced with one of three scenarios: alone in the waiting 
room, with two confederate passive bystanders, or with two other “real” participants. 
Latané and Darley’s results revealed that 75% of participants in the alone condition 
reported the emergency. In the group of only participants, 38% reported the event and only 
10% of those in the in confederate passive bystanders group reported the event. 
However, the presence of other bystanders may not necessarily lead to less 
willingness to intervene (cf. Fischer et al., 2011). For example, Chekroun and Brauer 
(2002) investigated the question of how bystander behavior is influenced by personal 
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implications of different situations. In their field study, the participants were confronted, 
either alone or with the presence of bystanders, with one of the two following situations. In 
one condition, a confederate drew graffiti on the walls of an elevator in shopping mall (low 
personal implication – because the elevator belongs to a company). In the other situation, a 
confederate was littering a public park. Specifically, he threw a large plastic bottle in the 
bushes as the participants were passing by (high personal implications – people valuing the 
park like their front yard). What they found is that individuals showed typical bystander 
behavior for the low personal implication condition. In other words, people were less 
willing to prevent the confederate from drawing graffiti in the elevator. But on the 
contrary, for the park situation, people’s willingness to take action was not affected by the 
presence of bystanders due to higher personal implications. 
Beyond that, in a study of Baumeister, Chesner, Senders, and Tice (1988) 
participants’ had to took part in a conversation task. Before the conversation started 
Baumeister and colleagues primed their participants either as group leaders or regular 
group members. They found that individuals who had been primed as group leaders were 
subsequently more willing to intervene in a staged emergency than those who had been 
primed as regular group members as they felt more personal responsibility and were thus 
less vulnerable to diffusion of responsibility. 
Furthermore, bystander behavior is influenced by the clarity of a situation. Clark 
and Word (1972) faced their participants alone, or in two-person or five-person groups 
with either an ambiguous or an unambiguous case of emergency. While the participating 
students were filling out some questionnaires, a custodian (a confederate of the 
experimenters) entered the room carrying a ladder and a set of Venetian blinds. After a 
couple of minutes, the participants heard a loud crash and groans of pain (unambiguous 
situation) or crash without verbal cues of pain or need for help (ambiguous situation). 
What Clark and Word (1972) found is that typical bystander behavior occurred for the 
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ambiguous emergency – participants were less willing to help when they faced the event in 
the group condition as compared to the alone condition. On the contrary, in the case of an 
unambiguous emergency, typical bystander behavior was not observed.  
These results lead to question if typical bystander behavior vanishes, or even 
reverses, in apparent cases of emergencies, especially in highly dangerous situations like 
the case of the young Turkish man described in the Introduction section. This question will 
be clarified in the positive bystander section.  
Taken together, the bystander effect is a robust phenomenon that means that the 
more bystanders are present the less people are willing to intervene in a critical incident. 
Moreover, this phenomenon occurs in many experimental and field studies, especially in 
ambiguous emergency situations, which are mostly non-emergency situations (cf. Fischer 
et al., 2011). This effect was observed for both sexes of participants and victims, for 
mostly all age groups, and is even stronger in cities than in rural areas (for detailed 
resources see: Fischer et al., 2011). However, several studies have been providing support 
that the bystander effect disappears in unambiguous situations (e.g., Clark and Word 
1972), most notably in highly dangerous ones (e.g., Fischer et al., 2011).  
 
2.5.2 The Dangerousness of an Emergency  
Research on bystander behavior has provided significant empirical evidence that 
the bystander effect reduces or even reverses in dangerous emergencies, especially in 
dangerous situations with a present perpetrator (cf. Fischer et al., 2011). Some selected 
empirical studies should underline this position.  
Schwartz and Gottlieb (1976) participants’ were asked to discuss a sexually 
embarrassing topic via an intercom. During the discussion, an intruder is heard starting a 
fight with another participant. They could hear a quarrel between the perpetrator and the 
victim, which was accompanied by signs of a physical fight. Their participants faced this 
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situation either alone or with other bystanders. What Schwartz and Gottlieb found is a 
reversed bystander effect, that is, individuals in the bystander condition were more likely 
to intervene than individuals who witnessed the situation alone.  
Furthermore, Harari, Harari, and White (1985) staged in their field experiment an 
attempted rape in parking lot. Their participants witnessed the following scenario, either 
alone or in groups of 2 or 3. A woman (staged by an actress) was walking casually with her 
back to the participants through the parking lot when suddenly a perpetrator (staged by an 
actor) appeared from the bushes and grabbed her roughly. He put one hand around her 
waist and the other on her mouth, followed by some muffled screams and final yell for 
help of the woman – an obvious dangerous emergency. The results of Harari and 
colleagues were similar to those of Schwartz and Gottlieb (1976). Participants in the 
bystander condition were again more likely to intervene.  
Beyond that, Fischer et al. (2006) experimentally manipulated the dangerousness 
(costs) for taking action in an emergency. The participants in this study observed, alone or 
in presence of a passive bystander (confederate), a supposed live broadcast of a cross-
gender communication, vividly staged by professional actors, in which the man sexually 
harassed the woman. In particular, the costs for intervention were manipulated by the 
physical stature of the perpetrator. In one condition, the perpetrator looked rather small and 
was of slight build (low danger), and in the other condition, the perpetrator was tall and 
fierce (high danger). The authors found typical bystander behavior for the low danger 
condition (5.9% helped in the bystander condition while 50% helped in the alone 
condition), but no effect occurred in high danger condition (44% and 40% helping in the 
no-bystander and the bystander condition, respectively).  
Additionally, Fischer and Greitemeyer (2013) investigated the interplay between 
the presence of a passive bystander (not present vs. present) in their field study and 
expected negative consequences (high vs. low) in a simulated bike theft. They found that 
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individuals were more willing to intervene in the presence of a bystander in the high 
negative consequences condition (i.e. when the bike thief looked fierce) compared to the 
low negative consequences condition. On the contrary, the expectation of negative 
consequences did not have an influence on the non-bystander condition. Taken together, 
the empirical research showed several cases where the bystander effect was reduced, or 
even reversed, in high danger emergency situations (cf. Fischer et al., 2011). But how can 
this seemingly conflicting phenomenon be explained? 
First of all, Fischer et al. (2006) argued that dangerous emergencies are recognized 
faster and less ambiguously. These facts increase the cost for not helping a victim. Due to 
this, a bystander’s perceived arousal should be increased, which might lead to an increased 
helping rate, independent of present bystanders. This argument is in line with the 
predictions of the arousal:cost-reward model (see Dovidio, Piliavin, Gaertner, Schroeder, 
& Clark, 1991). The model assumes that unambiguous and dangerous emergencies 
increase the arousal experienced, in accordance to the victim’ s distress, which can be 
reduced by helping the victim.  
This way of arguing is in line with the results of Greitemeyer, Fischer, 
Kastenmüller, and Frey (2006). In their work they found that high danger emergencies 
compared to low dangerous ones were perceived faster, were associated with more 
perceived personal responsibility to intervene, and associated with a higher degree of 
expected negative social consequences. Therefore, the model would explain why the 
bystander effect is reduced for dangerous emergencies.  
Furthermore, Fischer and colleagues (2011) proposed that the experienced arousal 
should be highest when a bystander perceives high levels of threat to the victim as well to 
themselves. In such a case, the bystander effect should be reduced. The meta-analysis of 
Fischer et al. (2011) supported this assumption but due to the lack of empirical evidence 
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for the underlying psychological process, more research must be carried out (cf. Fischer et 
al., 2011).  
Second, bystanders can be a source of physical support in dangerous emergencies. 
In particular, some situations can only be resolved by a group of people. For example, in a 
situation where one person is physically attacking another, it is very likely that an 
intervening bystander will also be attacked by the perpetrator. In this case, additional 
bystanders may provide support in defeating the perpetrator (cf. Fischer et al., 2011). This 
way of reasoning is in line with the results of Horowitz (1971). The researcher found that 
participants who believed that they were surrounded by a competent service group were 
more likely to help than in the alone condition. On the contrary, when the participants 
believed that they were surrounded by a group of random people, typical bystander 
behavior was shown. Thus, bystander behavior is not as unsympathetic as it has been 
typically portrayed in the last decades (Fischer et al., 2011). 
Third, a reduced bystander effect in dangerous cases of emergency could also be 
explained by a rational-choice hypothesis (Fischer et al., 2011). From this point of view, a 
bystander’ s decision whether to help or not is influenced by the perceived cost of 
intervening, the benefit of helping a victim, and the perceived probability that other 
bystanders will become active (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005).  
Basically, increased costs of helping would reduce people’s preparedness to take 
action in a scenario which requires intervention. However, there are many situations (e.g., 
a group of three men struggling with another group of five in a public place) that can be 
only solved when several bystanders are cooperating to provide effective and safe help (in 
this case, avoiding physical injury), which cannot be provided by a single individual 
(Fischer et al., 2011).  
To summarize, empirical research (e.g., Fischer et al., 2006; Fischer & 
Greitemeyer, 2013; Harari et al., 1985; Horowitz, 1971) and a meta-analytic review 
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(Fischer et al., 2011) have shown that typical bystander behavior (i.e., the greater the 
number of passive bystanders witnessing a case of emergency, the less they are willing to 
take action) is reduced in dangerous emergency situations, or reversed in situations with a 
present perpetrator. (i.e., a greater number of bystanders witnessing a critical incident, the 
more they are willing to intervene). This phenomenon could be explained by the following 
facts: (a) dangerous emergencies are perceived faster and less ambiguously, (b) passive 
bystanders can provide physical support, and (c) such situations can only be resolved when 
bystanders cooperate and coordinate their helping response (Fischer et al., 2011). 
 
5.2.3 Social Categorization Processes  
Imagine the following situation. You are big supporter of a certain soccer team. 
You and some friends of yours are sauntering through the city on a Saturday afternoon. 
You are passing by a stranger who wears a shirt of your favorite soccer club. As you have 
almost past the stranger he asks you for some change. Imagine this scenario again, but 
replace the shirt of your favorite team with a shirt of your favorite team’s greatest rival. In 
which of two scenarios would you be more willing to help out? Most people would be 
more willing to help out the stranger who supports the same team in presence of other 
bystanders. Findings on social categorization processes provide an explanation for this this 
phenomenon. 
Several studies have revealed that the social categories, related to both the 
bystanders and the victims, affect the frequency of helping (e.g., Levine, 1999; Levine, 
Cassidy, & Jentzsch, 2010; Levine, Cassidy, Brazier, & Reicher, 2002; Levine & 
Crowther, 2008). In a series of studies, Levine and Crowther (2008) manipulated the 
bystanders’ social categories (portraying them as strangers, students or friends; Study 1). 
Participants who imagined the presence of strangers and students showed typical bystander 
effect, whereas this bystander effect was diminished among those who imagined friends.  
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Furthermore, the willingness to help a victim is influenced by his or her social 
category (e.g., Levine et al., 2002, 2010). Levine and colleagues (2002; study 2) asked 
their participants to watch a short video clip captured on a local CCTV. The clip portrayed 
a staged attack on one man by two offenders. In one condition the participants were 
informed that the victim is an in-group member (belonging to the same university as the 
participants), in the other one the victim was depicted as an out-group member (a random 
man from the same city). Levine et al. (2002) found that individuals were more willing to 
help a victim (in the presence of one bystander) if they knew that the victim was an in-
group member.  
However, Levine (1999) also found that 38 individuals failed to intervene in the 
James Bulger murder trial (for more information see: Levine, 1999) as they noticed that the 
perpetrators and the victim were family members, which means that they belonged to the 
same social category.  
Taken together, the bystander effect is decreased when a potential helper and a 
victim are belonging to the same social category (e.g., friends), but individuals show 
typical bystander behavior if the victim and the antagonist share a category.  
 
2.6 The Implicit Bystander Effect 
Imagine that you have just won in a lottery. Your prize is a dinner for you and ten 
of your friends in your favorite restaurant. Now you just have to indicate on which day and 
what time you want to make your reservation. A few minutes after these great news you 
are asked if you would donate to charity. You decide to donate some money. Do you think 
that you would have donated a different amount of money if you had won a dinner for you 
and just one of your friends? Research on the implicit bystander effects provides answers 
to this question. In a series of studies Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz, and Darley (2002) first 
showed that simply thinking about a group is enough to evoke typical bystander behavior 
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in an a subsequent unrelated task (e.g. charity donating). In addition, Garcia, Weaver, 
Darley, and Spence (2009) found that public scrutiny moderates the implicit bystander 
effect. As a consequence implicit bystanders can as well increase and decrease helping 
behavior. Beyond that, Levine, Cassidy, and Jentzsch (2010) found that the implicit 
bystander effect is also qualified by an implicit identity effect. Participants who imagined 
in-group members did not show typical bystander behavior, whereas those who imagined 
strangers showed typical bystander behavior. 
 
2.7 The Positive Bystander Effect  
At the beginning of bystander research most studies focused on the inhibiting effect 
of present bystanders on emergency intervention. However, several studies have provided 
evidence that the presence of other bystanders can lead to an increased willingness to 
intervene in emergencies. This phenomenon is called the positive bystander effect - this is 
good news for society.  
Harari, Harari, and White’s (1985) field study is one of the first studies which 
showed that the presence of additional bystanders led to higher intervention rates in a 
staged rape attempt. Additionally, Fischer and Greitemeyer (2013) showed that the 
presence of other bystanders led to an increased rate of intervention in a simulated bike 
theft, when bystanders faced high negative consequences for intervening. These findings 
are in line with Fischer and colleagues’ (2011) arguing that a positive bystander effect 
especially occurs in high danger emergencies.  
Furthermore, Garcia, Weaver, Darley, and Spence (2009) provided preliminary 
evidence that the presence of other bystanders can facilitate helping behavior on an 
implicit level in situations where attention from a group is focused on a bystander. In line 
with Garcia et al.’s 2009 (findings), van Bommel, Prooijen, Elffers, and Van Lange (2012) 
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found that the bystander effect can be reversed in social settings with an increased public 
self-awareness. 
 
2.8 What we have learned thus far? 
More than 45 years of research on bystander behavior has shown that an 
individual’s willingness to help is not necessarily reduced by the presence of other 
bystanders (e.g., Chekroun & Brauer, 2002; Fischer et al., 2011; Levine & Crowther 2008). 
However, Latané and Darley’ s process model of help-giving (1970) is one of the most 
influential, accepted, and shared theoretical construct in psychology, especially in social 
psychology. There are few research papers, theoretical or applied, which are not based on 
this model. However, the basic assumption that an increased number of bystander leads to 
less helping seems to be applicable only in under determined circumstances (i.e., low-
danger situations, non-shared social categories, and situations with low personal impact).  
But on the contrary, the meta-analysis of Fischer and colleagues (2011) showed 
that bystanders, in the presence of other bystanders, are more willing to take action in 
dangerous emergencies (e.g., a fierce looking perpetrator is attacking a victim) compared 
to non-dangerous emergencies (e.g., when a weak looking and small perpetrator attacks 
someone). This phenomenon could be explained in three ways, as argued by Fischer et al. 
(2011). First, dangerous emergencies produce more arousal and therefore they are 
perceived less ambiguously. Consequently, bystanders would help a victim to reduce their 
arousal. Second, additional bystanders can be seen as resource of physical support in 
dangerous emergencies where single individuals fear negative social and physical 
consequences in the case of intervention (e.g., being offended by a perpetrator). Third, 
from a rational point of view, dangerous emergencies can only be resolved when several 
bystanders cooperate and coordinate their actions.  
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Furthermore, typical bystander behavior can also be reduced by sharing the same 
social category (e.g., Levine & Crowther, 2008). For example, when a victim and 
bystanders belong to the same college, the victim will receive more help even if there are 
more bystanders present compared to a situation in which the victim and bystanders do not 
share a social category (here: belongingness to a college). Additionally, bystanders’ 
willingness to help is also increased when they share a social category with other present 
bystanders (Levine & Crowther, 2008). Moreover, people are more willing to intervene in 
the presence of others in a situation with increased personal impact (Chekroun & Brauer, 
2002). Beyond that, Fischer and colleagues’ meta-analysis (2011) revealed that an 
increased bystander effect could have been observed in laboratory studies compared to 
field studies. This is a positive massage, because laboratory settings are mostly artificial 
compared to real-life helping situations, which were used in the field studies.  
What have we learned thus far? Bystander behavior is basically influenced by the 
number of present bystanders. An individual’s willingness to take action in situations 
which require intervention is effected by presence of others, dependent on the factors 
mentioned above. The particular case of dangerous emergencies leads to less bystander 
behavior, which is indeed a positive message.  
Beyond that, older studies (before 1975) showed a stronger bystander effect that 
more current ones (Fischer et al., 2011). This is again a positive massage, because people 
have learned, maybe through debriefings after participating in different studies. This way 
of arguing is in line with the results of Beaman, Barnes, Klentz, and McQuirk (1978). 
Their study showed that participants who were simply informed about bystander behavior 
(eg., through a 50 minutes lecture) compared to participants without information, were 
more likely to help. However, many questions still remain yet to be answered.  
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2.9 Open questions 
Although decades of bystander research have provided much insight into questions 
regarding why bystanders, even in the presence of other bystanders, are more willing to 
intervene only under determined circumstances, there is still much work to do, both 
theoretical and applied. Therefore, some unanswered questions are outlined below.  
First, we do not exactly understand how bystander behavior is influenced by certain 
psychological processes, namely (a) pluralistic ignorance, (b) diffusion of responsibility, 
and (c) evaluation apprehension, postulated by Latané and Darley (1970). What we know 
is that all these three processes can dissuade a bystander from taking action in 
emergencies. But what we do not know is whether it is possible to prime these three 
psychological processes separately or not. In such a case, it would be highly interesting to 
find whether they do have different impacts on people’s willingness to help and how they 
affect different cases of emergency.  
For example, we do not know whether individuals who are primed on pluralistic 
ignorance will show less intention to help a person in need as compared to an individual in 
a control condition. Additionally, these psychological processes may have different 
impacts in high-dangerous situations compared to low-dangerous situations. In this regard, 
empirical research in this area has to be done. 
Second, it is not clear if the bystander effect also occurs on a collective level – does 
a so called “collectivist bystander effect” exist? Most of the studies on bystander behavior 
have been conducted on an individual-level and have been typically conducted as follows. 
Participants work either alone or in group with other present bystanders on a task (e.g., 
filling out questionnaires) when a critical incident occurs (e.g., someone is yelling from 
pain). The participants are evaluated on whether they are intervening or not, how long it 
takes them to intervene, and how they intervene. However, especially in real-life-scenarios, 
some emergencies are not witnessed by a single individual surrounded by other bystanders.  
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Finally, it is possible that social groups (e.g., three different groups of friends) are 
witnessing an emergency. For that reason the questions arises whether bystander inhibition 
can be extended to the group level. Some studies of Fischer and colleagues (unpublished 
manuscript) provided first evidence that bystander behavior can also be observed on the 
group level but more empirical evidence is needed.  
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
 
Are we all heroes?  
Increased helping intentions in high-cost helping situations.  
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3.1 Abstract 
This series of three studies examined whether helping behavior is more influenced 
by responsibility attributions, situational characteristics or kinship. We explored the 
interplay between perceptions of a victim’s responsibility for its plight; the type of helping 
behavior; and the relationship between the helper and the victim. The results showed that 
people are more willing to help victims perceived as being innocent in their plight, but only 
in low-danger situations. In more dangerous scenarios, people’s willingness to intervene 
increases with the level of perceived danger, regardless of responsibility attributions. This 
effect is partly driven by people’s accepted costs for helping the person in need. However, 
only marginal effects for kinship were observed. The findings indicate that people’s 
helping intentions can partly be predicted by attribution theory and kinship-selection 
theory. 
 
3.2 Background 
People’s willingness to help those in need is influenced by a multitude of factors. 
These include the perceived dangers of the situation at hand (Fischer et al., 2011); the cost-
benefit ratios of both action and passiveness (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 
2005); the number of bystanders present (Fischer et al., 2011); attributions of responsibility 
(Piliavin, Rodin, & Piliavin, 1969; Weiner, 1980, 1996); and the relationship (i.e, kinship) 
between the potential helper and the person in need (Burnstein, Crandall, & Kitayama, 
1994).  
Past research has examined factors such as responsibility and kinship as separate 
variables, arguing that individuals in need will receive less help if they are seen to be 
responsible for their own plights (attribution theory; Weiner, 1980), and that people should 
be more willing to help close relatives (e.g., siblings, parents) than acquaintances 
(Burnstein et al., 1994). However, potential interaction between these two factors means 
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that they should also be considered together. For example, Greitemeyer, Rudolph and 
Weiner (2003) found that while responsibility judgments determined helping behavior 
more than kinship in non-life-or-death situations, this pattern was reversed in scenarios 
where inaction could lead to the person in need perishing, with kinship taking precedence 
over responsibility attributions.  
Although previous research on attribution theory, relationship, and the interaction 
of both has provided great insight to the question whether a person in need will receive 
help, or not, little is known whether these effects can be observed in specific types of 
helping behaviors. To be more specific, McGuire (1994) showed that different helping 
situations can be subsumed under four types of helping behaviors, in particular: casual, 
substantial personal, emotional, and emergency helping. Typical casual helping scenarios 
are: lending someone class notes, pick up items at a store, or give money for the public 
transport. Typical substantial personal helping scenarios are: clean up somebodies house, 
cover for something, or help to move out of town. Typical emotional helping scenarios are: 
provide moral support, keep company, or hug somebody. Typical emergency helping 
scenarios are: take somebody to the hospital, protect from harassment, or offer help after 
an accident.  
Previous research on attribution theory has manly investigated one type of helping 
behavior (e.g., Betancourt, 1990; Kojima, 1992; Meyer & Mulherin, 1980; Weiner, 1980; 
Zucker & Weiner, 1993). Furthermore, past research on the relationship between the 
person in need and a help-giver (e.g., Burnstein et al., 1994) examined mostly casual and 
emergency helping (i.e. life-or-death scenarios), whereas research on the interplay between 
attribution and relation (e.g., Greitemeyer et al., 2003) manly focused on emotional and 
emergency helping. To the best of our knowledge, no study has covered all different types 
of helping behaviors. Therefore, we are trying to close this gap by systematically 
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investigating the interplay between attribution and relation based on McGuire’s (1994) 
taxonomy of helping behaviors. 
Beyond this, little is known whether moral courage (a specific type of helping 
behavior) is affected by responsibility attributions and kinship. Before we can answer this 
question we have to clarify what is meant by moral courage, especially, what are the 
similarities and dissimilarities of helping behavior in general and moral courage?  
 
3.2.1 Similarities and dissimilarities of helping behavior and moral courage 
Helping behavior in general (henceforth: helping behavior) and moral courage 
(moral courage) are subtypes of pro-social behavior (Bierhoff, 2002; Fischer, Greitemeyer, 
Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Jonas, & Rudukha, 2004; Greitemeyer, Fischer, Kastenmüller, & Frey, 
2006; Greitemeyer, Osswald, Fischer, & Frey, 2007; Niesta Kayser, Greitemeyer, Fischer, 
& Frey, 2010). Helping behavior is defined as well-intended voluntary assistance given to 
individuals (Bierhoff, 2002). However, there is currently no clear definition of moral 
courage (cf. Fischer et al., 2004; Jonas & Brandstätter, 2004; Greitemeyer et al., 2006; 
Labuhn, Wagner, van Dick, & Christ, 2004). It is instead summarized as a brave behavior, 
mostly borne of inhabiting a minority position, which is shown after an individual’s 
subjective sense of justice is violated in situations implying highly negative social 
consequences for the person who is going to intervene (cf. Fischer et al., 2004; Jonas & 
Brandstätter, 2004; Greitemeyer et al., 2006; Labuhn et al., 2004). For a long time, 
research had made no distinction between these two constructs (cf. Bierhoff, 2002), despite 
moral courage and helping behavior differing in quite a few attributes (e.g., Fischer et al., 
2004; Greitemeyer et al., 2006; Niesta Kayser et al., 2010).  
Help-giving and moral courage may be distinguished by the costs of acting (Fischer 
et al., 2004; Greitemeyer et al., 2006; Jonas & Brandstätter, 2004; Niesta Kayser et al., 
2010). Help-giving is mostly connected with relatively low personal costs (e.g. Niesta 
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Kayser et al., 2010), while moral courage implicates high personal costs (e.g. Greitemeyer 
et al., 2006), especially from negative social consequences (Fischer et al., 2004; 
Greitemeyer et al., 2006). Furthermore, moral courage can lead to norm violations, while 
help-giving does not (Jonas & Brandstätter, 2004). 
Help-giving and moral courage situations can be also distinguished by their social 
constellations (Fischer et al., 2004; Jonas & Brandstätter, 2004; Niesta Kayser et al., 2010). 
In moral courage situations, triads exist consisting of a victim (who does not have to be 
present in the situation), a perpetrator and the person intervening. In contrast, in help-
giving situations there is only a dyadic interaction between a victim and a help-giver (Jonas 
& Brandstätter, 2004). 
Additionally, Greitemeyer et al. (2006) found that moral courage situations are 
perceived faster than help-giving situations, and are associated with both more personal 
responsibility and a higher degree of expected negative social consequences. Moral 
courage is also connected with the greater salience of societal norms and more anger at the 
perpetrator. Additionally, help-giving situations elicit more evaluation apprehension 
(Greitemeyer et al., 2006).  
 
3.2.1 The Present Research 
The aim of the present research is twofold. First, the present research seeks to 
clarify the question whether people’s helping intentions are differently affected by 
responsibility and kinship in different helping behaviors. According to McGuire (1994), 
determining this is of theoretical importance, as it may elucidate whether people’s helping 
intentions are best predicted by either Weiner’s (1980) attribution theory, or kinship 
explanations, or by an interaction of both in different types of helping behavior. Moreover, 
answering this question can reveal whether the findings of Weiner’s attribution theory and 
kinship explanations can be generalized across different types of help behavior.  
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Second, the present research seeks to investigate whether peoples helping intentions 
in moral courage scenarios can be predicted by either Weiner’s (1980) attribution theory or 
kinship explanations. Determining this is of theoretical importance, as it may elucidate 
whether people’s helping intentions in moral courage situations are best predicted by either 
Weiner’s (1980) attribution theory or kinship explanations. Moreover, there are also 
considerable practical implications, as the consequences of inaction in moral courage 
situations may be enormous for the person in need, regardless of their responsibility for 
their plight. An example is the case of a Greek man in Munich who was chased and 
brutally beaten up by a group of right-wing skinheads in 2001. A Turkish man witnessed 
the scene and decided to take action; pulling the victim aside and saving his life (see 
Fischer et al., 2011). If he had not intervened, it is likely that his inaction would have led to 
the Grecian’s death.  
We hypothesize that people’s willingness to help in high-cost situations (i.e., moral 
courage situations and emergency helping scenarios) should be at the same level, 
independent of whether the person in need is perceived as being responsible for their 
plight. This is because moral courage situations and emergency helping scenarios are 
connected; both being associated with a potentially high personal cost for failing to 
intervene (cf. Fischer et al., 2011). Furthermore, moral courage situations and life-or-death 
scenarios are understood to require intervention more quickly and clearly (cf. Greitemeyer 
et al., 2006).  
In contrast, we predict that for low-cost helping situations (i.e. casual, substantial 
personal, and emotional scenarios), people will be less willing to aid a person in need if 
they are seen as being responsible for their own plight, compared to someone seen as 
‘innocent’ (cf. Weiner, 1980, 1996). Finally, we also hypothesize that only low-cost 
helping situations will be affected by the relationship between the helper and the person in 
need, because moral courage situations and life-or-death scenarios are associated with a 
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much higher cost for not intervening than low-cost helping situations (cf. Fischer et al., 
2011; Greitemeyer et al. 2006). 
 
3.3 Study 3.1 
The purpose of the first study is to investigate the interplay between perceptions of 
a victim’s responsibility for their plight, the relationship between the helper and the victim, 
and the type of helping behavior. Moreover, Study 3.1 aims to systematically investigate 
this interplay based on McGuire’s (1994) taxonomy of different helping behaviors. For 
low-cost situations (i.e., casual, substantial personal, and emotional scenarios) we assume 
that people should show be less willing to help others if they are perceived as being 
responsible for their plight, whereas those who are perceived as not responsible should 
receive more help. However, for high-cost situations (i.e., emergency scenarios) we predict 
that no such effect should occur. Furthermore, we expect a similar pattern for the 
relationship between a help-giver and a person in need. Again, in low-cost situations 
people should be more willing to help close relative than acquaintances, however, for high-
cost situations we expect that the relationship should not affect the willingness to help.  
 
3.3.1 Method 
 Participants and Design. 
Participants were recruited via e-mail lists and received no payment for 
participating. The sample consisted of 272 participants (192 females and 80 males). The 
participants’ age ranged from 18 to 75 years (M = 33.10, SD = 14.04).  
To test our predictions a 2 × 2 × 4 mixed-design was employed. We manipulated 
the person in need’s responsibility for their plight (“responsible” vs. “not responsible”) and 
the relationship between the helper and the person in need (“close relative” vs. 
“acquaintance”) between-subjects. Whereas, the type of helping behavior (“casual” vs. 
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“substantial personal” vs. “emotional” vs. “emergency”) was treated as within-subject 
factor. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four between-subject conditions.  
 Procedure. 
All of the participants were asked to read four short vignettes, which portrayed a 
person who needed help. Subsequent each vignette, they answered a questionnaire that 
asked for their evaluation of the perceived responsibility of the person in need, their 
evaluation of the dangerousness of the situation, and their behavioral intentions. All items 
and scenarios were presented in a randomized order (for an exemplary questionnaire see 
Appendix A). 
 Scenarios. 
The used scenarios are based on McGuire’s (1994) taxonomy of helping behaviors. 
To cover a wide range of scenarios, we produced two scenarios for each situation. 
However, all participants evaluated only one randomly chosen scenario of each situation.  
Casual helping scenarios. 
In the first casual helping scenario participants had to imagine that a person (either 
a close relative or an acquaintance) wanted to borrow a book from them to get prepared for 
an exam. Additionally, it was mentioned that they did not need book at that time. In the 
responsible condition, the person was not able to afford the book, because the person spent 
its money on other unimportant things. In the non-responsible condition, the person was 
not able to afford the book, because the person had financial problems. 
In the second casual helping scenario participants had to imagine they are doing 
some shopping after a long day of work on a rainy day. Suddenly, a person (either a close 
relative or an acquaintance) called them and asked them to bring some stuff form the shop. 
In the responsible condition, the person was simply too lazy to leave its flat. In the non-
responsible condition, the person was not able to the shopping due to a severe cold.  
Substantial personal helping scenarios. 
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In the first substantial personal helping scenario participants had to imagine that 
they had a day off. During the day, a person (either a close relative or an acquaintance) 
called and asked them whether they could help the person cleaning up its apartment. In the 
responsible condition, the person in need had celebrated a big party the day before to 
which the participants were not invited. In the non-responsible condition, it was mentioned 
that the person was sick and alone at home. Therefore, the person was not able to clean up. 
In the second substantial personal helping scenario the participants had to imagine 
that a person (either a close relative or an acquaintance) asked them to lend it a bigger 
amount of money to afford next month’s rent. In the responsible condition, it was 
mentioned that person in need is known for lavishly spending money. In the non-
responsible condition, the person need in needed the money because somebody had stolen 
its credit card and withdrew a big amount of money. 
Emotional scenarios. 
In the first emotional helping scenario, based on Greitemeyer et al. (2003), 
participants had to imagine that a person (either a close relative or an acquaintance) sought 
consolation after she or he was left by her or his former mate. In the responsible condition, 
the depicted person had betrayed her or his mate so often that the mate could not any 
longer tolerate this behavior, hence the mate decided to break up. Furthermore, it was 
mentioned that the person in need did not regret his or her behavior and had no feelings of 
remorse. In the non-responsible condition, the person in need’s mate fell in love with 
another individual. Therefore, it was impossible for the mate to keep up the original 
relationship. 
In the second emotional helping scenario, participants had to imagine that a person 
(either a close relative or an acquaintance) sought consolation after he or she got taken off 
the university register because he or she did not pass an important exam. In the responsible 
condition, the person in need was not able to continue his or her studies because he or she 
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had been caught committing fraud. In the non-responsible condition, the person in need 
failed the important exam due to his or her exam nerves.  
Emergency scenarios. 
In the first emergency helping scenario, based on Greitemeyer et al. (2003), 
participants had to imagine driving themselves behind another person (either a close 
relative or an acquaintance) on the highway. Out of the blue, the other person’s car 
skidded, turned over, and stopped at side of the road. After the other’s car had stopped it 
caught fire and it was in imminent danger of exploding. In the responsible condition, the 
depicted person was initially driving too fast and had previously too many drinks do drive. 
In the non-responsible condition, the person in need was driving according to the speed 
limit and had no alcoholic drinks before driving. 
In the second emergency helping scenario, participants had to imagine that they are 
waiting for a train at a highly frequented railway station. A train was already within sight. 
Suddenly, a person (either a close relative or an acquaintance) fell on the rails. In the 
responsible condition, the depicted person had been fooling around and was obviously 
drunk. In the non-responsible condition, the person suffered a circulatory collapse. As a 
consequence of the collapse the person fell on the rails. 
 Dependent Variables. 
Once participants had finished reading the vignette, they completed a short 
questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of three scales, which assessed the person in 
need’s responsibility for their plight (Cronbach’s α = .91), participants’ perceived 
dangerousness for helping (α = .53), and the participant’s willingness to help them (α = 
.86). The scales consisted of three or two items, respectively, which were responded to on 
a Likert scale from 0 (not at all) to 7 (very much). To measure responsibility, participants 
completed the items: “How controllable is the cause of the plight of your close 
relative/acquaintance?”; “In your eyes, how responsible is your close relative/acquaintance 
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for their plight?” and “Do you think that this is your close relative/acquaintance’s fault?” 
To measure perceived dangerousness of the situation, participants completed the items: 
“How dangerous would it be for you, if you would intervene in the depicted scenario?”, 
“How dangerous would it be for the person in need if you would not intervene?”. To assess 
behavioral intentions, participants answered the following questions: “How likely is it that 
you would help your close relative /acquaintance?”, “How important is it for you to help?” 
and “How certain is it that you would help?” 
 
3.3.2 Results 
 Manipulation Check. 
A t test revealed that participants in the responsibility conditions perceived the 
individuals in need as being significantly more responsible for their plights (M = 4.80, SD 
= 1.14) than participants in the non-responsibility (M = 2.05, SD = 0.93) conditions, t(270) 
= -21.81, p < .001, d = 2.64. We may thus say that the responsibility manipulation was 
successful. 
Additionally, we tested whether used scenarios had an effect on the perceived 
dangerousness. Maulchy’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been 
violated, χ²(5) = 73.22, p < .001, therefore Greenhouse-Geisser corrected tests are reported 
(ε = .83). The results of a repeated-analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant 
effect of the scenarios on the perceived dangerousness of the situation, F(2.50, 677.69) = 
666.20, p < .001. A post-hoc-test (Bonferroni) revealed that the participants perceived the 
casual helping scenarios (M = 1.26, SD = 1.31) as less dangerous than the substantial 
personal helping scenarios (M = 2.33, SD = 1.97, p < .001, r = .40). The substantial 
personal helping scenarios (M = 2.33, SD = 1.97) and emotional helping scenarios were on 
same level of perceived dangerousness (M = 2.32, SD = 1.43, p = .942, r < .01). However, 
the emergency scenarios (M = 6.30, SD = 1.91) were perceived as more dangerous than the 
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Table 3.1 
Means and standard deviations of participants’ willingness to intervene ratings (Study 3.1) 
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emotional helping scenarios (M = 2.32, SD = 1.43, p < .001, r < .92). We may thus 
say that the dangerousness manipulation was successful. 
 Effects of Attribution, Situational Attributes, and Relationship on Helping. 
A 2 × 2 × 4 mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for the Type of 
helping behavior. Given that Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had 
been violated, χ² (5), p < .001, therefore Greenhouse-Geisser corrected tests are reported (ε 
= .77), F(2.32, 621.06) = 280.70, p < .001. The same ANOVA also revealed a significant 
main effect for both responsibility (F(1, 268) = 26.67, p < .001) and relation (F(1,268) = 
7.15, p = .008). For means and standard deviations see Table 3.1. 
However, there was a significant Type of helping behavior × Responsibility 
interaction, F(2.32, 621.06) = 21.91, p < .001. To break down this interaction, a simple 
effect analysis for each situation was performed. A simple effect analysis revealed that in 
the casual helping scenario condition, participants were more willing to provide assistance 
when the person in need was not responsible for their plight than when they were 
responsible for it, F(1,268) = 18.29, p < .001, r = .25. In the substantial personal helping 
scenario condition, participants were more willing to provide assistance when the person in 
need was not responsible for their plight than when they were responsible for it, F(1,268) = 
39.18, p < .001, r = .36. On the contrary, no responsibility-based difference was observed 
in the emotional helping condition F(1,268) = 1.85, p = .176, r = .08. This finding was 
echoed in the emergency helping condition, F(1,268) = 0.20, p = .660, r = .03. The 
interaction graphs can be obtained from Figure 3.1. 
Additionally, there was a significant Type of helping behavior × Relationship 
interaction, F(2.32, 621.06) = 4.26, p =.011. To break down this interaction, a simple effect 
analysis for each situation was performed. A simple effect analysis revealed that in the 
casual helping condition, participants were more willing to provide assistance to close 
relative than to an acquaintance, F(1,268) = 8.84, p = .003, r = .18. A similar effect 
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occurred in the substantial personal helping condition. Participants were more willing to 
provide assistance to a close relative than to an acquaintance, F(1,268) = 7.56, p = .006, r = 
.17. On the contrary, no relationship-based difference was observed in the emotional 
helping condition F(1,268) = 0.01, p = .981, r < .01. This finding was echoed in the 
emergency helping condition, F(1,268) = 1.17, p = .280, r = .07.  
Neither the Responsibility × Relationship interaction (F(1, 268) = 1.19, p = .277), 
nor the Type of helping behavior × Responsibility × Relationship interaction (F(2.32, 
621.06) = 2.03, p = .124) was significant.  
 
3.3.3 Discussion 
The results of Study 3.1 support the idea that people’s willingness to help others 
can be partially predicted by Weiner’s (1980) attribution theory. To be more specific, 
people were more likely to help a person in need when they were perceived as not being 
responsible for their plight, this effect was only observed in low-cost helping situations 
(i.e., casual helping and substantial personal helping). However, for emotional helping and 
emergency helping (i.e., higher-cost helping situations) people’s helping intentions were 
not influenced by responsibility judgments. 
Additionally, Study 3.1 provides partially support for the idea that people’s 
willingness to help others can be predicted by relationship (i.e., kinship). In low-cost 
helping situations (i.e., casual helping and substantial personal helping) people are more 
willing to help close relatives than acquaintances, whereas no such effect occurred in 
higher-cost helping situations (i.e., emotional helping and emergency helping).  
Nevertheless, Study 3.1 has to be limited in a way that we did not include a moral 
courage scenario. Therefore, Study 3.2 sought to extend the findings of Study 3.1 by 
including a moral courage scenario. 
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Figure 3.1. Behavioral intentions to help a person in need. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals.  
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3.4 Study 3.2 
The second study aimed to replicate and to extend the findings of Study 3.1. We 
hypothesize that people’s willingness to help in both moral courage situations and 
emergency scenarios should be at the same level, independent of whether the person in 
need is perceived as being responsible for their plight. This is because moral courage 
situations and life-or-death scenarios are connected; both being associated with a 
potentially high personal cost for failing to intervene (cf. Fischer et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, moral courage situations and emergency scenarios are understood to require 
intervention more quickly and clearly (see Greitemeyer et al., 2006).  
In contrast, we predict that for low-cost helping situations, people will be less 
willing to aid a person in need if they are seen as being responsible for their own plight, 
compared to someone seen as ‘innocent’ (Weiner, 1980, 1996). Finally, we also 
hypothesize that only low-cost helping situations will be affected by the relationship 
between the helper and the person in need, because moral courage situations and 
emergency scenarios are associated with a much higher cost for not intervening than 
helping situations (cf. Fischer et al., 2011; Greitemeyer et al. 2006).  
 
3.4.2 Method 
Given that in Study 3.1, the casual, substantial personal, and emotional helping 
scenarios scored very low at the perceived dangerousness to intervene scale we collapsed 
them into a low-cost helping condition. 
 Participants and Design. 
Participants were recruited at a lecture at a university. The sample consisted of 290 
students (223 female and 65 male, 2 participants did not indicate their sex). The 
participants’ age ranged from 18 and 39 years (M = 21.16, SD = 2.70). Participants 
received course credit in exchange for their participation. 
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To test our predictions a 2 × 3 × 2 between subjects design was employed to 
manipulate the person in need’s responsibility for their plight (“responsible” vs. “not 
responsible”), the kind of situation (“helping” vs. “moral courage” vs. “life-or-death”), and 
the relationship between the helper and the person in need (“sibling” vs. “acquaintance”). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 12 experimental conditions.  
 Procedure. 
All of the participants were asked to read a short vignette which portrayed a person 
who needed help. They then answered a questionnaire that asked for their evaluation of the 
situation and their behavioral intentions.  
 Scenarios. 
The low-cost helping and emergency helping scenarios employed in the study were 
replicated from Greitemeyer et al. (2003). For a detailed description of the scenarios 
consult the scenario section of Study 3.1. Additionally, we also added a vignette depicting 
a moral courage scenario. The participants had to imagine the following situation: an 
individual who did not look foreign (either an acquaintance or a sibling) was being 
attacked by three young men in a pedestrian zone. The perpetrators were clearly 
identifiable as right-wing troublemakers. In the ‘responsible’ condition, the person in need 
had verbally offended the perpetrators prior to the attack, while in the ‘not responsible’ 
condition, no such information was mentioned.  
 Dependent Variables. 
Once they had finished reading the vignette, participants completed a short 
questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of two scales, which assessed the person in 
need’s responsibility for their plight (α = .86) and the participant’s willingness to help them 
(α = .88). The used items were the same that we used in Study 3.1. 
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3.4.2 Results 
 Manipulation Check. 
A t test revealed that participants in the high responsibility conditions perceived the 
individuals in need as being significantly more responsible for their plights (M = 4.41, SD 
= 2.96) than participants in the low responsibility (M = 1.43, SD = 1.25) conditions, t(288) 
= -13.29, p < .001, d = 1.57. We may thus say that the responsibility manipulation was 
successful. Given that the dangerousness evaluation of the situation was successful in 
Study 1, we did not assess the perceived dangerousness of the situation in this study.  
 Effects of Attribution, Situational Attributes, and Relationship on Helping. 
A 2 × 3 × 2 ANOVA revealed significant main effects for both responsibility 
(F(1,278) = 8.59, p = .004, η² = .02) and type of helping behavior (F(2,278) = 14.96, p < 
.001, η² = .09) as well as a marginal effect for relationship (F(1,278) = 3.58, p = .059, η² = 
.01). Participants were more willing to help individuals who were not responsible for their 
plight than individuals who were seen as being responsible for their situations. For means, 
standard deviations, and cell sizes see Table 3.2. 
With regard to the dangerousness of a situation, a post-hoc-test (LSD) revealed that 
participants were more willing to help in life-or-death scenarios compared to moral 
courage scenarios (p < .001) and helping scenarios (p < .001). No difference between 
moral courage and helping scenarios was observed, p = .26. Participants were marginally 
more willing to help a sibling than an acquaintance.  
The ANOVA also indicated a significant interaction between responsibility and 
type of helping behavior, F(2,278) = 9.06, p < .001, η² = .05. A simple effect analysis 
revealed that in the helping situation condition, participants were more willing to provide 
assistance when the person in need was not responsible for their plight (M =  
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Table 3.2.  
Means and standard deviations of participants’ willingness to intervene ratings (Study 3.2) 
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Figure 3.2. Behavioral intentions to help a person in need. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals.  
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5.99, SD = 0.88) than when they were responsible for it (M = 4.67, SD = 1.89), 
t(284) = 5.00, p < .001. On the contrary, no responsibility-based difference was observed 
in the moral courage condition (not responsible: M = 5.68, SD = 1.21; responsible: M = 
5.41, SD = 1.45), t(284) = 1.05, p = .296). This finding was echoed in the life-or-death 
condition (not responsible: M = 6.17, SD = 1.25; responsible: M = 6.41, SD = 0.72, t(284) 
= -0.91, p = .363). The interaction graphs can be obtained from Figure 3.2. 
Neither the Type of helping behavior × Relationship interaction (F(1, 278) = 4.29, p 
= .073), nor the Situation × Responsibility × Relationship interaction (F(2, 278) = 0.78, p = 
.457) was significant.  
 
3.4.3 Discussion 
The findings of Study 3.2 indicate that people’s willingness to help others increases 
with an increased dangerousness of a situation. However, this effect is qualified by an 
interaction with the perceived responsibility for being in a plight. In line with the results of 
Study 3.1, Study 3.2 indicates that people’s willingness to help others can be partially 
predicted by Weiner’s (1980) attribution theory. To be more specific, people were more 
likely to help a person in need when they were perceived as not being responsible for their 
plight, this effect was only observed in lower-cost helping situations. However, for moral 
courage situations and life-or-death-scenarios (i.e., higher-cost helping situations) people’s 
helping intentions were not influenced by responsibility judgments. 
However, Study 3.2 provides marginal support for the idea that people’s 
willingness to help others can be predicted by relationship. This finding indicates that the 
relationship (i.e., kinship) between a person in need and a help-giver might not predict 
people’s willingness to help as strong as Burnstein et al.’s (1994) findings. 
Nevertheless, Study 3.2 has to be limited in three ways. First, some might argue 
that the moral courage scenario and the life-or-death scenario are too similar, therefore we 
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use a different moral courage scenario in Study 3.3. Second, we did not check whether all 
participants had siblings, as a consequence it cannot be ruled out the some participants had 
no siblings. Therefore, we use close relatives instead of siblings in Study 3.3. Third, Study 
3.2 is not able to provide an answer to question which psychological process drives these 
findings. Hence, Study 3.3 aims to provide an answer to this question. 
 
3.5 Study 3.3 
The third study aimed to replicate the findings of Study 3.2. Therefore, we 
hypothesize as in Study 3.2 that people’s willingness to help in both moral courage 
situations and life-or-death scenarios should be at the same level, independent of whether 
the person in need is perceived as being responsible for its plight. In contrast, we predict 
that for helping situations, people will be less willing to aid a person in need if they are 
seen as being responsible for their own plight, compared to someone seen as ‘innocent’ (cf. 
Weiner, 1980, 1996). We also hypothesize that only helping situations will be affected by 
the relationship between the helper and the person in need. 
Additionally, Study 3.3 aimed to clarify the underlying psychological process 
which could explain why people are willing to help others in need the more dangerous a 
situation is. Based on the arousal: cost-reward model (Dovidio, Piliavin, Gaertner, 
Schroeder, & Clark, 1991) we hypothesize that the perceived costs for intervening could be 
the psychological process. To be more specific, the arousal: cost-reward model proposes 
that people who witness another person’s distress feel a certain level of arousal. The more 
dangerous a situation becomes the higher the arousal level becomes. An increased arousal 
level becomes increasingly aversive. As a consequence, a person is motivated to reduce 
this aversive arousal. As supposed by Fischer, Greitemeyer, Pollozek, and Frey (2006), an 
effective way to reduce this negative arousal is to help the person in need to decrease his or 
her level of distress.  
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3.5.1 Method 
 Participants and Design. 
Participants were recruited via e-mail lists and received no payment for 
participating. The sample consisted of 346 participants (203 female and 143 male. The 
participants’ age ranged from 18 and 77 years (M = 30.63, SD = 12.06).  
To test our predictions a 2 × 3 × 2 between subjects design was employed to 
manipulate the person in need’s responsibility for their plight (“responsible” vs. “not 
responsible”), the type of helping behavior  (“low-cost helping” vs. “moral courage” vs. 
“life-or-death”), and the relationship between the helper and the person in need (“close 
relative” vs. “acquaintance”). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 12 
experimental conditions.  
 Procedure. 
All of the participants were asked to read a short vignette, which portrayed a person 
who needed help. They then answered a questionnaire that asked for their evaluation of the 
situation and their behavioral intentions.  
 Scenarios. 
In the low-cost and life-or death conditions we used the same scenarios as in Study 
3.2. However, we used a different moral courage scenario as in Study 3.2. The participants 
had to imagine the following situation: You have an appointment with a person (either an 
acquaintance or a close relative) in a bar in the evening. At the bar you are sharing some 
news with the person. At some point you went to the bathroom. After you return from the 
bathroom you could observe that a stranger is verbally sexually harassing the person who 
is with you. In the ‘responsible’ condition, the person in need had been intensively flirting 
with the stranger prior to the harassment, while in the ‘not responsible’ condition, no such 
information was mentioned.  
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 Dependent Variables. 
We assessed the person in need’s responsibility for their plight (α = .83) and the 
participant’s willingness to help (α = .81) in the same as in Study 3.1 and 3.2. 
In addition to Study 3.1 and 3.2 we assessed accepted costs for helping the person 
in need and the perceived costs for the person in need if they participants are not going 
help. Based on Fischer et al. (2006), the accepted costs for helping was assessed by one 
item: “Seeing the person in need, I did not mind the costs of helping.” and: “Seeing the 
person in need, I was greatly bothered by the costs of helping?” (reversed coded). Given 
that the items were intercorrelated (α = .76) we collapsed them into a simple score of 
perceived costs. 
 
3.5.2 Results 
 Manipulation Check. 
A t test revealed that participants in the high responsibility conditions perceived the 
individuals in need as being significantly more responsible for their plights (M = 4.39, SD 
= 1.67) than participants in the low responsibility (M = 2.04, SD = 1.33) conditions, t(344) 
= -14.49, p < .001, d = 1.56. We may thus say that the responsibility manipulation was 
successful. 
 Effects of Attribution, Situational Attributes, and Relationship on Helping. 
A 2 × 3 × 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant main effects for 
type of helping behavior, F(2,346) = 2.65, p < .001, η² = .14. A post-hoc-test (LSD) 
indicated that participants were more willing to help in life-or-death scenarios (M = 6.01, 
SD = 1.02) and moral courage scenarios (M = 5.84, SD = 1.34) compared to helping 
scenarios (M = 4.98, SD = 1.35, both ps < .001). No difference between moral courage and 
life-or-death scenarios was observed, p = .252. 
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Table 3.3  
Means and standard deviations of participants’ willingness to intervene ratings (Study 3.3) 
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The ANOVA revealed neither a significant main effect for relationship (F(1,346) = 
0.10, p = .752, η² < .01), nor a significant main effect for responsibility (F(1,346) = 1.78, p 
= .183, η² < .01).  
The ANOVA also indicated a significant interaction between responsibility and 
type of helping behavior, F(2,278) = 5.84, p = .003, η² = .05. A simple effect analysis 
revealed that in the low-cost helping condition, participants were more willing to provide 
assistance when the person in need was not responsible for their plight (M = 5.33, SD = 
1.20) than when they were responsible for it (M = 4.60, SD = 1.89), t(340) = 3.47, p < .001. 
On the contrary, no responsibility-based difference was observed in the moral courage 
condition (not responsible: M = 5.72, SD = 1.12; responsible: M = 5.97, SD = 0.97), t(340) 
= -1.21, p = .227). This finding was echoed in the life-or-death condition (not responsible: 
M = 6.02, SD = 1.00; responsible: M = 6.02, SD = 1.12, t(340) < 0.01, p = .999). The 
interaction graphs can be obtained from Figure 3.3. 
Neither the Type of helping behavior × Relationship interaction (F(1, 334) = 0.85, p 
= .427), nor Responsibility × Relationship interaction (F(1, 334) = 1.01, p = .316), nor the 
Type of helping behavior × Responsibility × Relationship interaction (F(2, 334) = 1.49, p = 
.227) was significant. For means, standard deviations, and cell sizes see Table 3.3. 
Accepted costs for helping. 
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for the dangerousness of the 
situation, F(1,343) = 151.29, p < .001, η² = .47. A post-hoc-test (LSD) indicated that 
participants perceived lower costs for helping in the helping condition (M = 3.52, SD = 
1.95) than in the moral courage condition (M = 4.08, SD = 1.66, p = .006) and the life-or-
death condition (M = 6.83, SD = 0.50, p < .001), respectively. Additionally, participants 
perceived lower costs for helping in the moral courage condition than in the life-or-death 
condition (p < .001). 
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Figure 3.3. Behavioral intentions to help a person in need. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals.   
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 Mediational Analysis. 
Based on the arousal: cost-reward model we tested whether perceived costs for 
helping a person in need mediates the effect of the dangerousness of the situation on the 
willingness to intervene. Given that our predictor is a multicategorical variable (low-cost 
helping vs. moral courage vs. life-or-death) we conducted the mediation analysis as 
recommended by Hayes and Preacher (2014).  
From a mediation analysis conducted using PROCESS Model 4 (Hayes, 2013), the 
dangerousness of the situation indirectly influenced the willingness to intervene through its 
effect on the perceived accepted costs for helping a person in need. As can be seen in 
Figure 3.4, participants in the moral courage condition perceived higher accepted costs for 
helping a person in need compared to the low-cost helping condition (a1 = 0.554, LLCI = 
0.022, ULCI = 0.217). Moreover, participants in the life-or-death condition perceived 
higher accepted costs for helping a person in need compared to the low-cost helping 
condition (a2 = 3.313, LLCI = 2.913, ULCI = 3.713). Participants who perceived higher 
accepted costs for helping a person inn need showed a higher willingness to intervene (b = 
0.178, LLCI = 0.099, ULCI = 0.256). Bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals for the 
first (a1b = 0.098) and the second (a2b = 0.588) relative indirect effect based on 10,000 
bootstrap samples were entirely above zero  
However, there was also evidence that the situation itself influenced the willingness 
to help. To be more specific, participants in the moral courage condition were more willing 
to help compared to the low-cost helping condition (c‘1 = .0768). Moreover, participants in 
the Life-or-Death condition were more willing to help compared to the low-cost helping 
condition (c‘2 = 0.457). 
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Figure 3.4. The perceived accepted costs for intervening mediate the effect of the situation 
on the willingness to intervene. PC = perceived accepted costs for intervening, D1 = 
difference between low-cost helping and moral courage, D2 = difference between low-cost 
helping and life-or-death, WTI = willingness to intervene. 
 *p < .05 **p < .001. 
 
 
 
3.5.3 Discussion 
The results of Study 3.3 replicate the findings of Study 3.2 and extend them by 
providing insight about the underlying psychological process. 
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In line with the results of Study 3.1 and 3.2, Study 3.3 indicates that people’s 
willingness to help others can be partially predicted by Weiner’s (1980) attribution theory. 
People were more likely to help a person in need when they were perceived as not being 
responsible for their plight. However, this effect was only observed in lower-cost helping 
situations, whereas no such effect occurred in moral courage situations and life-or-death-
scenarios (i.e., higher-cost helping situations). 
Moreover, Study 3.3 provides no significant support for the idea that people’s 
willingness to help others can be predicted by relationship. In line with findings of Study 
3.2, the result of Study 3.3 indicates that the relationship (i.e., kinship) between a person in 
need and a help-giver might not predict people’s willingness to help as strong as Burnstein 
et al.’s (1994) findings indicated. 
Finally, the results of Study 3.3 revealed that people’s willingness to help is partly 
driven by accepted costs for helping a person in need. In line with Fischer et al.’s (2006) 
findings, we found that the more dangerous a situation becomes people accept higher costs 
for helping and as consequence people are more willing to help a person in need.  
 
3.6 General Discussion 
The present research supports the idea that people’s willingness to help others can 
be partially predicted by Weiner’s (1980) attribution theory. Across three studies, we found 
that while people were more likely to help a person in need when they were perceived as 
not being responsible for their plight, this effect was only observed in low-cost helping 
situations. For higher-cost helping situations such as moral courage and life-or-death 
scenarios, people’s helping intentions were not influenced by responsibility judgments. 
From a theoretical point of view, the findings imply that people’s helping intentions cannot 
be predicted in the all-encompassing manner suggested by attribution theory. Instead, 
attribution theory is useful when predicting individuals’ willingness to help in low-cost 
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situations (i.e., casual and substantial personal helping situations), but has less explanatory 
power when examining scenarios based upon moral courage or featuring life-or-death 
outcomes.  
Additionally, the results revealed that kinship does not have a particularly strong 
impact on helping, in contrast to the suggestions of Burnstein et al. (1994). It instead seems 
that the tendency to help can be better predicted by the type of helping behavior itself than 
by the relationship between the helper and the person in need. Some might argue that this 
finding seem counterintuitive. However, past research showed that people are more willing 
to help in-group members rather than out-group members (e.g., Hornstein, 1972; Levine, 
Cassidy, Brazier, & Reicher, 2002). Given that in all three studies the presented persons in 
need were in-group members (i.e. highly inclusive in-group members), our results are in 
line with these findings. Moreover, this way of arguing is strengthened by Levine, Prosser, 
Evans, and Reicher’s (2005) findings which showed that people’s helping behavior is 
positively affected by category inclusiveness. 
Concerning the perceived dangerousness of a situation, the results provide further 
support for Fischer et al.’s (2006, 2011) findings that people are more willing to take 
action if the situation implies a high cost for failing to intervene. Furthermore, as 
demonstrated by the Munich attack case (Fischer et al., 2006), individuals also seem to be 
more willing to help in more dangerous situations (i.e., moral courage and life-or-death 
situations) than in non-dangerous ones; particularly when inaction has enormous 
consequences. Moreover, the present research indicates that this effect is partly driven by 
accepted costs for helping the person in need. A mediation analysis revealed that the more 
dangerous a situation becomes people accept higher costs for helping, and as consequence 
people are more willing to help a person in need. This way of arguing is in line with 
Fischer et al.’s (2006) results and the arousal: cost-reward model.  
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However, the present findings also suggest that willingness to help cannot be 
predicted solely by attribution theory or by the kind of helping behavior. As a consequence 
of this finding, future research should thus consider how the interplay between perceived 
responsibility and the dangerousness of a situation impacts helping intentions. 
Although the results of the present research are consistent across three studies, the 
have to be limited in several ways. First, the results of the present research revealed 
consistently (Study 3.1, 3. 2, and 3.3) that people had higher helping intensions in high-
cost helping situations. However, Study 3.1 showed that people’s intention to help were 
also high in casual helping situations. Given that casual helping scenarios scored very low 
on the perceived dangerousness to intervene, people may associate very little costs to help 
a person in need. If this would be the case, this would indicate that he helping intention 
curve would be U-shaped. In other words, people would be more willing to help if the 
costs for helping are almost zero. In low to medium-cost situation the helping intentions 
should decrease, and in high-cost situations the helping curve should increase again. 
Therefore, future research should examine this prediction by using a more fine-tuned 
measure of costs for helping. 
Second, given that written instructions have some drawbacks (i.e., in high-cost 
scenarios), future research should try to replicate our findings by using video presentations. 
Participants found video presentations more engaging and they reported greater feelings of 
involvement compared to written instructions (Sleed, Durrheim, Kriel, Solomon, & Baxter, 
2002). 
Third, we are aware of the fact that we assessed behavioral intentions, and not real 
behavior. Therefore, future research should try to replicate these findings with 
measurements that are closer to real behavior. 
Taken together, people’s intentions to help others in need cannot be predicted by 
simple factors (e.g., the perceived responsibility for being in a plight or the relationship 
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between a helper and the person in need). Future studies should thus continue the present 
research’s focus on the interplay between different factors. It would also be advisable to 
work on an encompassing model of helping intentions – which could include as many 
factors as have been investigated – to predict helping intentions in the most accurate and 
effective way.  
   
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
 
Does the help seeker’s status differently affect the kind of provided help in  
individualistic vs. collectivistic cultures? 
 
“Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach a man to fish and you feed him for a 
lifetime.” (Confucius) 
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4.1 Abstract 
Recent research has demonstrated that it is not sufficient to put the focus only on the 
binary decision to provide help, or not. Help seekers with low status receive more 
dependency-oriented help, whereas help seekers with high status receive more autonomy-
oriented help. In a series of three studies, we examined whether type of help provision is 
moderated by culture. The results of the present research showed that help seekers’ status 
affected the type of provided help in highly individualistic cultures (Study 4.1, Study 4.2, 
and Study 4.3). This effect on help type also occurred in the middle of the individualistic-
collectivistic continuum (Study 4.2), whereas no such effect occurred in collectivistic 
cultures (Studies 4.1 & 4.3). Theoretical and practical implications for helping behavior 
are discussed. 
 
4.2 Background 
Imagine the following situation: a person who has some difficulties to solve a 
mathematical equation asks you for help. How would you respond to this request? Your 
decision to help or not is influenced by situational, personal, interpersonal, and cultural 
factors. While deciding whether to help, you might not realize that you've also made a 
decision about how you would help, and individuals from different cultural backgrounds 
approach helping behavior in distinct ways. 
 
4.2.1 Determinants of Helping Behavior 
Situational factors such as the clarity of the problem affect the willingness to help. 
In an unambiguous situation 100% of individuals helped a person in need, whereas in an 
ambiguous situations the helping rate drops to 20-40% depending on the presence of 
bystanders (Clark and Word, 1972). This finding is in line with the urban overload 
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hypothesis. Milgram (1970) found that people in bigger cities are less willing to help 
others than people in smaller cities, as a result of the constant overload of stimuli that 
people have to process in bigger cities. City-dwellers have to more actively choose which 
stimuli to ignore, and this causes requests for help to be overlooked (Milgram, 1970). 
Willingness to help is also affected by personal determinants such as a cost-
reward analysis (e.g., Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005; Piliavin, Dovidio, 
Gaertner, & Clark, 1981). Rewards for helping include reputational gain and the 
reduction of cognitive dissonance. Costs for helping include psychological aversion (e.g., 
helping someone who is bleeding), possible physical harm (e.g., getting beaten up), social 
disrespect (e.g., judgment by observers), effort and time (e.g., missing a train), or 
monetary costs. Not helping can lead to feelings of guilt, blame, or general negative 
arousal. This is consistent with Fischer et al.’s (2006) findings that people are more 
willing to help a victim in situations with increased costs for helping. Increased costs for 
helping lead to a higher level of unpleasant arousal hence people try to reduce this 
negative arousal by helping a person in need. 
Interpersonal factors also affect willingness to help, and social identity theory 
(SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) and social categorization processes (for review, see 
Hornsey, 2008) outline key interpersonal features that affect help provision. For example, 
M. Levine and colleagues showed that the willingness to help others in need is influenced 
by the belongingness to a social category (e.g., M. Levine, 1999; M. Levine & Crowther, 
2008). To be more specific, M. Levine (1999) showed that people were less willing to 
help a person in need if this person and a perpetrator belong to the same social category. 
However, if a person in need and potential helpers belong to same social category (e.g., 
both are supporters of the same soccer team) the person in need will receive more help 
(M. Levine & Crowther, 2008). Another interpersonal determinant is the socioeconomic 
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status (SES) of a help seeker that can predict whether somebody will receive help, or not 
(e.g., Bickman, 1971; Goodman & Gareis, 1993; Solomon & Herman, 1977). Bickman 
(1971) found that participants provided more help to confederates with a high SES than 
to confederates with a low SES. In Bickman’s study SES was manipulated by the 
confederates’ attire, either they wore a suit (high SES) or working clothes (low SES). A 
similar result revealed Solomon and Herman’s (1977) study. Solomon and Herman 
manipulated SES in their study by the car that the help seeker was driving. They found 
that a confederate who drove a high status car received help more often than a 
confederate who drove a low status car. However, more recent research revealed that a 
help seeker’s SES does not influence the probability whether he or she receives help but 
SES affects the kind of help that a person will receive (Nadler & Chernyak-Hai, 2014).  
To predict whether a person will receive help, or not, is also affected by cultural 
determinants (e.g., Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Henrich et al., 2005; Knafo, Schwartz, & 
Levine, R., 2009; R. Levine, Norenzayan, & Philbrick, 2001). For example, Knafo, 
Schwartz, and Levine, R. (2009) showed that strangers received less help in highly 
embedded cultures. Moreover, a field study by R. Levine, Norenzayan, and Philbrick 
(2001) revealed that the tendency to help strangers varied across countries from very high 
rates of 93% in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and 81% in Vienna, Austria; to low rates of 45% 
in New York, United States; and 40% in Kuala Lampur, Malaysia. This trend was stable 
across different helping measures (i.e., returning an accidently dropped pen, helping a 
handicapped person to pick accidently dropped magazines, or helping a blind person to 
cross the street). However, R. Levine et al. (2001) could not observe a clear cultural or 
geographic trend in helping strangers in need. They found a very diverse pattern for the 
most helpful places (e.g., Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Calcutta, India; or Vienna, Austria) and 
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the least helpful places (e.g., Sofia, Bulgaria; Amsterdam, Netherlands; or Kuala Lampur; 
Malaysia), respectively.  
Taken together, previous research on situational, personal, interpersonal, and 
cultural determinants has provided great insight to question whether a person will receive 
help, or not. However, it is not sufficient to put the focus only on the binary decision to 
provide help, or not (Nadler & Chernyak-Hai, 2014).  
 
4.2.2 Does a Help Seeker Always Benefit from Receiving Help? 
Recall the example from the beginning of this paper. Perhaps you decided to help 
with the mathematical problem by just providing the solution. What will be the 
consequences for the help seeker? Do you think that you would have reacted differently if 
the help seeker have had a high SES? How would you feel, if you ask somebody for help 
and you would just receive the solution to the problem? 
Previous research showed that people who ask for help and just receive the 
solution feel dependent and inferior in comparison to the help giver (Nadler, 1991; 
Nadler & Fisher, 1986). Moreover, Nadler and Chernyak-Hai (2014) highlighted the 
importance of the kind of provided help. They showed in a series of studies that people 
offer different kinds of help in dependence of the help seeker’s SES. To be more specific, 
they found that people provide dependency-oriented help (e.g., providing the concrete 
solution to a problem) more often to help seekers with a lower SES (e.g., having a lower 
IQ than the help-giver, being a kitchen hand), whereas people provide autonomy-oriented 
help (e.g., offering tools to solve problem) to help seekers with a high SES (e.g., having a 
IQ, or being a medical doctor). However, Nadler and Chernyak-Hai (2014) found that 
people’s general readiness to help is not affected by the help seeker’s status, but the type 
of help is affected. In a long run, these helping styles will cause help seekers with low 
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SES to remain at the same status, whereas help seekers with high SES will be able to 
increase their status. Below, we test this phenomenon across different cultures. 
 
4.2.3 The Present Research 
The present research tries to answer the question whether help seekers' SES 
differently affects the kind of help received in different cultures (i.e., individualistic vs. 
collectivistic cultures). It is crucial to answer this question for theoretical (e.g., do we 
have to modify the framework of helping behavior) and for practical reasons (e.g., reduce 
stigma-consistent behavior).  
Given that individualism (Hofstede, 1980) is defined as “a loosely knit social 
framework in which people are supposed to take care of themselves and of their 
immediate families only”, and people’s self-image is defined in terms of “I”, whereas 
collectivism is defined as “a tight social framework in which people distinguish between 
ingroups and outgroups, [and] expect their ingroups to look after them, and in exchange 
for that they feel they owe absolute loyalty to it”, and people’s self-image is defined in 
terms of “we” (Hofstede, 2001). We expect that people in an individualistic culture 
should focus more on the help seeker’s SES than in a collectivistic culture. Therefore, a 
help seeker with high SES should receive more autonomy-oriented help in an 
individualistic culture, whereas a help seeker with a low SES should receive more 
dependency-oriented help. However, in a collectivistic culture a help seeker’s SES should 
not affect the kind of provided help.  
This logic is in line with Schwartz’s findings on cultural value orientations 
(Schwartz, 1994, 2008). Schwartz (1994) showed a positive correlation between 
Hofstede’s individualism dimension and Schwartz’s autonomy cultural level dimension 
and a negative correlation between Hofstede’s collectivism dimension and Schwartz’s 
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embeddedness cultural level dimensions. In cultures with an emphasis on autonomy, 
people are: (a) viewed as autonomous entities, (b) encouraged to express their own 
preferences, ideas, feelings, and abilities, (c) encouraged to pursue affectively positive 
experience for themselves, and (d) encouraged to pursue their own ideas and intellectual 
directions independently (Schwartz, 1994, 2008). In cultures with an emphasis on 
embeddedness, people: (a) are viewed as entities embedded in the collectivity, (b) are 
giving meaning to their life largely through social relationships, shared activities, and 
shared goals, and (c) emphasizing on maintaining the status quo and restraining actions 
that might disrupt in-group solidarity or the traditional order (Schwartz, 1994, 2008). 
Taken together, based on Hofstede’s individualism-collectivism dimension 
(Hofstede, 1980, 2001) and Schwartz’s autonomy-embeddedness cultural value 
orientation (Schwartz, 1994, 2008) we expect for people who live in an individualistic 
culture the same results as Nadler and Chernyak-Hai (2014). Whereas for people who 
live in a collectivistic culture we predict that the help seeker’s status should not affect the 
kind of provided help.  
 
4.3 Study 4.1 
The first study examined what kind of help (i.e., dependency-oriented vs. 
autonomy-oriented) participants provided to help seekers in dependence of the help 
seekers’ status. Moreover, Study 4.1 was designed to examine whether this effect is 
influenced by participants’ cultural background (i.e., individualistic vs. collectivistic). We 
hypothesized that participants within an individualistic culture provide more autonomy-
oriented help to a help seeker with a high SES and more dependency-oriented help to a 
help seeker with low SES. For participants within a collectivistic culture we expected that 
the help seeker’s SES should not affect the kind of provided help.  
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4.3.1 Method 
Country selection. 
On the basis of the latest World Values Survey (WVS) data 
(www.worldvaluessurvey.org) on autonomy orientation 
(http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp) and Hofstede’s (2001) 
individualism-collectivism dimension we chose Germany as a proxy for an individualistic 
culture and Turkey as a proxy for a collectivistic culture. Germany scored higher (M = 
0.63, SD = 0.26) on autonomy than Turkey (M = 0.43, SD = 0.32) in the WVS. Moreover, 
Germany scores high on individualism (67) thus Germany can be seen as an 
individualistic country, whereas Turkey scores low on individualism (37) thus Turkey 
can be seen as a collectivistic country (Hofstede, 2001). 
Participants and Design. 
86 participants were entered into a 2 (cultural background: individualistic vs. 
collectivist culture) × 2 (help seeker’s SES: low vs. high) between-subjects design. We 
manipulated SES experimentally. Participants were recruited via e-mail lists and received 
no payment for participating. However, 12 participants failed to complete the study, and 
the final sample consisted of 74 participants (35 Germans and 39 Turks). The German 
sub-sample consisted of 18 females and 17 males. The Turkish sub-sample consisted of 
16 females and 23 males. The participants’ age ranged from 18 to 61 (M = 21.16, SD = 
2.70). Participants were similarly distributed across conditions. 
Procedure and Scales. 
We used a similar procedure as Nadler and Chernyak-Hai (2014). After 
participants had opened the webpage they were informed that they are participating in an 
online study about interactions while working on problem solving tasks. Additionally, 
they were informed that they could quit at any time without giving any reason and that all 
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gathered data will be treated confidently. Subsequently, participants had to fill out a 
demographic questionnaire which assessed participants’ age, sex, education, and 
occupation. Then, participants were told that they had been randomly assigned to work 
with another participant ostensibly online at the same time. The participants were told the 
study was about ‘bipolar’ interactions where one participant has to guide the work of the 
other. Therefore, participants would be either assigned to the role of the guide or the 
problem solver. All participants were informed that they had been assigned to the role of 
the guide and were shown background information about the other person.  
The participants were then informed that would work with a 30-year-old German 
man, respectively Turkish man, who had either a high or low SES. Additionally, the 
participants were informed that they would not be any further interaction between them 
and the problem solver. In this study the SES was manipulated via random assignment to 
occupation. Half of the participants were informed that the problem solver was a medical 
doctor (high SES), while the other half had been informed that the problem solver was a 
craftsman (low SES; SES manipulation based on Ganzeboom, De Graaf, & Treiman, 
1992).  
After the status manipulation, participants rated their expectations of the problem 
solver’s performance as a manipulation check (Nadler and Chernyak-Hai, 2014): “How 
intelligent, in your opinion, is the problem solver?”, “How successful, in your opinion, 
will the problem solver be in solving the tasks?”, and “How much effort, in your opinion, 
will the problem solver put into solving the tasks?”. Given that all three items were 
intercorrelated (α = .74; all presented alpha values are Cronbach’s α) they were summed 
to a single index. Additionally, one item asked directly for the perceived SES of the 
problem solver. All items were assessed on a 5-point Likert-type scale of 1 (not at all) to 
5 (absolutely). 
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Subsequent to the SES evaluation, participants were informed that the problem 
solver had to work on five different tasks (i.e., mathematical problems and verbal 
problems). After seven minutes the participants received a message from the problem 
solver that he had problems solving two tasks. To be more specific, in this message the 
problem solver asked the participants for help because he had problems solving the 
following mathematical sequence: “Continue the following sequence: 2, 5, 10, 13, 16, 29, 
?“ and solving a scrambled letters task: “If you bring the following letters (e.g., T, Ü, L, 
M, H, A, L – for the German participants) in the correct order you get?”. After the 
participants had received the message they could see the tasks, which the problem solver 
had not been able to solve, including the solution and description how to get the right 
solution. Subsequently, the participants could decide whether they would respond to the 
message, or not. If the participants had decided to reply, they could choose whether to 
provide just the solution (dependency-oriented help), or the way to the solution 
(autonomy-oriented help).  
Subsequent to the help request, all participants were asked to evaluate the problem 
solver’s general ability, friendliness, and attraction (see Nadler and Chernyak-Hai, 2014). 
Participants evaluated the problem solver whether or not they replied to the help request. 
General ability was measured by four items (α = .82): “How powerful is the problem 
solver?”, “How intelligent is the problem solver?”, “How creative is the problem 
solver?”, and “How independent is the problem solver?”. Friendliness was measured by 
two items (α = .83): “Do you think that the problem solver is a warm person?” and “Do 
you think that the problem solver is a friendly person?”. Attraction was measured by two 
items (α = .77): “How much do you like the problem solver?” and “How much would you 
want to have the problem solver as a workmate?”. All items were assessed on 5-point 
Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (absolutely).  
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Subsequently, the participants were asked whether they had participated in a 
similar study and whether they had an idea about the purpose of the study as a suspicion 
check. Finally, participants were thanked for participating and fully debriefed about the 
study according to APA ethical standards (for an exemplary questionnaire see Appendix 
B).  
4.3.2 Results  
Manipulation and suspicion checks. 
A 2 (SES: high vs. low) × 2 (culture: individualistic vs. collectivistic) ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of the factor SES, F(1,73) = 7.94, p = .006, η² = .10. Participants 
rated the performance expectation of the problem solver higher in the high SES condition 
(M = 4.08, SD = 0.59) than in the low SES condition (M = 3.68, SD = 0.85). There was 
no main effect of culture, F(1,73) = 2.32, p = .132, η² = .03, nor of the two-way 
interaction, F(1,73) = 2.04, p = .158, η² = .03.  
Additionally, a 2 (SES: high vs. low) × 2 (culture: individualistic vs. 
collectivistic) ANOVA revealed a main effect of the factor SES, F(1,73) = 24.32, p < 
.001, η² = .25. Participants rated the perceived SES of the problem solver higher in the 
high SES condition (M = 4.39, SD = 0.68) than in the low SES condition (M = 3.47, SD = 
1.05). There was no main effect of culture, F(1,73) = 2.11, p = .151, nor a two-way 
interaction, F(1,73) = 3.76, p = .057, η² = .04. These findings suggest a successful 
manipulation of the perceived SES of the problem solver independent of the participants’ 
cultural background.  
No participant indicated that she or he had participated in a similar study. 
Furthermore, no participant named the actual purpose of the study. 
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Check for interfering effects. 
Based on R. Levine et al.’s (2001) findings which showed that the readiness to 
help others differed among different countries, we tested whether the readiness to help 
the problem solver differentiated between countries. A chi-square test revealed no 
difference between countries’ readiness to help, χ² (1, N = 74) = 0.28, p = .599. 
Furthermore, we tested whether women’s readiness to help the problem solver 
differentiated from men’s readiness. Given that women and men react differently in 
different helping situations (for a meta-analytic review see: Eagly & Crowley, 1986). A 
chi-square test revealed no difference between women’s and men’s readiness to help, χ² 
(1, N = 74) = 0.21, p = .644. 
We also checked whether participants’ rating of the problem solver differed based 
on the perceived problem’s solver general ability, friendliness, and attraction, and there 
were no significant effects, ps > .290. 
Helping responses. 
The overall readiness to help was high; 77% of the participants were ready to help 
independent of the help seeker’s SES. A three-way loglinear analysis produced a final 
model that retained all effects. The likelihood of this model was χ² (0) = 0, p = 1. This 
indicated that the highest-order interaction (the help seeker’s SES × culture × kind of help 
interaction) was significant, χ² (1) = 6.07, p = .009. To break down this effect, separate 
chi-square tests on help seeker’s SES and type of provided help were performed 
separately by cultures.  
In the individualistic culture, help seeker’s SES predicted type of help offered, χ² 
(1) = 9.75, p = .002. In contrast, in the collectivistic culture help seeker’s SES did not 
predict type of help, χ² (1) = 0.10, p = .756.  
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Odds ratios indicated that the odds of receiving autonomy-oriented help for a help 
seeker with high SES were 6.00 times higher in the individualistic culture, but only 1.11 
in the collectivistic culture. Moreover, odds ratio indicated that the odds of receiving 
dependency-oriented help for a help seeker with low SES were 3.00 times higher in the 
individualistic culture, but only 0.71 in the collectivistic culture (for the distribution of 
helping frequencies in the dependence of the help seeker’s SES see Figure 4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1. Type of help provided  
 
frequency: autonomy vs. dependency oriented based on help seeker’s SES and 
participants’ cultural background. 
Note. Frequency distributions are based on the participants who decided to help.  
 
4.3. Discussion 
The findings provide support for our hypothesis. Participants in the high SES 
condition provided more autonomy-oriented help to help seekers, and participants in the 
low SES condition provided more dependency-oriented help, but only in the 
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individualistic culture. However, no such effect occurred in the collectivistic culture. In 
other words, within an individualistic culture the help seeker’s status had an impact on 
the kind of provided help, but not in a collectivistic culture.  
Nevertheless, Study 4.1 limited in a way that we only compared a high 
individualistic country with a high collectivistic country. Therefore, Study 4.2 extended 
the findings of Study 4.1 in additional countries, especially by including a country that 
scores on the mid-level on the collectivism-individualism dimension. 
 
4.4 Study 4.2 
The second study aimed to replicate and to extend the findings of Study 4.1. As 
Study 4.1, Study 4.2 examined what kind of help participants provided to help seekers in 
dependence of the help seekers’ status and whether this effect is influenced by 
participants’ cultural background. We hypothesized that participants within a highly 
individualistic culture provide more autonomy-oriented help to a help seeker with a high 
SES and more dependency-oriented help to a help seeker with low SES. Given that 
Nadler and Chernyak-Hai (2014) collected their data in Israel, a country that scores on 
mid-level of the collectivism-individualism dimension (Hofstede, 2001), we expect the 
same effect but it should not be as big as within a highly individualistic culture. 
 
4.4.1 Method 
Country selection. 
On the same basis as in Study 4.1, we chose the United States as a proxy for a 
highly individualistic culture and India as a proxy for a culture which is on the mid-level 
of the collectivism-individualism dimension. The autonomy scores for the United States 
(M = 0.52, SD = 0.28) and India (M = 0.52, SD = 0.32) are at the same level. However, 
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the United States score high on individualism (91) thus the United States can be seen as 
an individualistic country, whereas India scores moderate on individualism (48) thus 
India can be seen as a mid-level country (Hofstede, 2001). 
Participants and Design. 
To test our predictions the participants participated in a 2 (cultural background: 
individualistic vs. collectivist culture) × 2 (help seeker’s SES: low vs. high) between-
subjects design. Help seeker's SES was manipulated. Participants were recruited via 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and received US$ 0.70 for their participation (see 
Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011, for validation of the MTurk population). 11 
participants failed to complete the study and the final sample consisted of 118 
participants (61 U.S. Americans and 57 Indians). The U.S. American sub-sample 
consisted of 28 females and 33 males. The Indian sub-sample consisted of 19 females and 
38 males. The participants’ age ranged from 18 to 63 (M = 32.70, SD = 9.56). 
Participants were similarly distributed across conditions. 
Procedure and Scales. 
The procedure and used scales were very similar to those in Study 4.1. In short, 
participants had been informed that were participating in an online study about 
interaction while working on a problem solving task. In addition to Study 4.1, 
participants completed an attention check to improve data quality (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, 
& Davidenko, 2009). The IMC consisted of text about planets in our solar systems. 
Participants were asked to estimate the number of planets in our solar system. Instead of 
indicating a number, participants had to type “Earth” in a text field to pass successfully 
the IMC. Following the IMC participants reported their demographics and were informed 
that they would work with a 30-year-old U.S. American man, respectively Indian man, 
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who had either a high or low SES. The randomly assigned SES manipulation was similar 
to Study 4.1, but here high SES was “medical doctor” and low SES was “kitchen hand”).  
As in Study 4.1, participants rated their expectations of the problem solver’s 
performance expectations (α = .80) and perceived SES as manipulation check. Helping 
responses, general ability (α = .86), friendliness (α = .71), and attraction (α = .85) were 
assessed in the same way as in Study 4.1. As in Study 4.1, participants were asked 
whether they had participated in a similar and whether they had an idea about the purpose 
of the study as a suspicion check. Finally, participants were thanked for participating and 
fully debriefed about the study according to APA ethical standards.  
 
4.4.2 Results  
Manipulation and suspicion checks. 
35 participants failed to answer the IMC correctly. However, excluding those 
participants did not change the results, and therefore all statistical analyses are based on 
the full sample. 
 A 2 (SES: high vs. low) × 2 (culture: individualistic vs. collectivistic) ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of the factor SES, F(1,117) = 23.21, p < .001, η² = .16. Participants 
rated the performance expectation of the problem solver higher in the high SES condition 
(M = 4.35, SD = 0.56) than in the low SES condition (M = 3.77, SD = 0.72). The 
ANOVA revealed no main effect for the factor culture, F(1,117) = 0.57, p = .451, η² < 
.01. However, the ANOVA revealed a significant two-way interaction, F(1,117) = 4.13, p 
= .044, η² = .03. This two-way interaction indicated that participants rated the 
performance expectation of the problem solver higher in the high SES condition than in 
the low SES condition. However, the difference between the high SES condition and the 
low SES condition was bigger in the individualistic sample (high: M = 4.54, SD = 0.41 
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vs. low: M = 3.71, SD = 0.72) than in the collectivistic sample (high: M = 4.20, SD = 0.60 
vs. low: M = 3.86, SD = 0.73). 
Additionally, A 2 (SES: high vs. low) × 2 (culture: individualistic vs. 
collectivistic) ANOVA revealed a main effect of the factor SES, F(1,117) = 136.76, p < 
.001, η² = .49. Participants rated the perceived SES of the problem solver higher in the 
high SES condition (M = 2.75, SD = 0.52) than in the low SES condition (M = 1.49, SD = 
0.66). However, the ANOVA revealed a significant two-way interaction, F(1,117) = 
15.51, p < .001, η² = .06. This two-way interaction indicated the participants rated 
perceived SES of the problem solver higher in the high SES condition than in the low 
SES condition. However, the difference between the high SES condition and the low SES 
condition was bigger in the individualistic sample (high: M = 2.91, SD = 0.29 vs. low: M 
= 1.26, SD = 0.50) than in the collectivistic sample (high: M = 2.63, SD = 0.61 vs. low: M 
= 1.81, SD = 0.74). Thus it can be assumed that status successfully manipulated the 
perceived SES of the problem solver, independent of the participants’ cultural 
background.  
Ten participants indicated that he or she had participated in a similar study. 
However, none of those participants named the actual purpose of the study therefore they 
remained in the sample.  
Check for interfering effects. 
As in Study 4.1 there was no difference between countries’ readiness to help, χ² 
(1, N = 114) = 2.63, p = .105. Women’s readiness to help the problem solver did not 
differ from men’s readiness, χ² (1, N = 114) = 0.45, p = .510. Furthermore, a series of 2 
(SES: high vs. low) × 2 (culture: individualistic vs. collectivistic) ANOVAs revealed 
neither main effects for SES or culture, nor significant two-way interactions on the 
perceived problem’s solver general ability, and attraction. However, another ANOVA 
Status Effects on Helping in Different Cultures  89 
reveled that participants rated the problem solver’s friendliness higher in the 
individualistic culture (M = 4.33, SD = 0.64) than in the collectivistic culture (M = 4.02, 
SD = 0.76), F(1,117) = 3.01, p < .014, η² = .05. 
Helping responses. 
66.10% of the participants were ready to help across all levels of help seeker’s 
SES. The three-way loglinear analysis produced a final model that retained all effects. 
The likelihood of this model was χ² (0) = 0, p = 1. The highest-order interaction (help 
seeker’s SES × culture × kind of help) was not significant, χ² (1) = 0.243, p = .622. 
However, the two-way interaction was significant, χ² (4) = 12.90, p = .003. 
To break down this effect, separate chi-square tests on help seeker’s SES and kind 
of provided help were performed separately for the highly individualistic culture and the 
collectivistic culture on mid-level of the individualism-collectivism continuum. For the 
highly individualistic culture there was a significant association between the help seeker’s 
SES and what kind of help the help seeker received, χ² (1) = 6.531, p = .011. Moreover, 
for the culture on mid-level of the individualism-collectivism continuum there was a 
marginal significant association between the help seeker’s SES and what kind of help the 
help seeker received. χ² (1) = 3.640, p = .054. 
Odds ratios indicated that the odds of receiving autonomy-oriented help for a help 
seeker with high SES were 2.80 times higher in the highly individualistic culture, 
whereas in the culture on mid-level of the individualism-collectivism continuum the odds 
were smaller at 2.40. Moreover, odds ratio indicated that the odds of receiving 
dependency-oriented help for a help seeker with low SES were 1.89 times higher in the 
highly individualistic culture, whereas in the culture on mid-level of the individualism-
collectivism continuum the odds were 1.67 (for the distribution of helping frequencies in 
the dependence of the help seeker’s SES see Figure 4.2).  
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Figure 4.2. Type of help provided 
 
 
 
frequency: autonomy vs. dependency oriented based on help seeker’s SES and 
participants’ cultural background. 
Note. Frequency distributions are based on the participants who decided to help. 
 
4.4.3 Discussion 
The findings of this study provided support for our hypothesis that participants in 
the high SES condition provide more autonomy-oriented help to a help seeker, whereas 
participants in the low SES condition provide more dependency-oriented help. Moreover, 
Study 4.2 revealed that this effect was bigger in the U.S (a highly individualistic culture) 
compared to India (mid-level on individualism-collectivism).  
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Study 4.2 is limited by using a similar SES manipulation as in Study 4.1. 
Therefore, Study 4.3 sought to replicate the findings of Study 4.1 and 2 with a different 
SES manipulation. Moreover, Study 4.3 sought to the findings of Study 4.1 and 2 by 
keeping the relative status difference between the help seeker and the help giver constant. 
 
4.5 Study 4.3 
The third study aimed to replicate and extend the above findings. In Study 4.3, the 
relative status difference between the help giver and help seeker was kept constant. As 
the above Studies, Study 4.3 examined what kind of help participants provided to help 
seekers in dependence of the help seekers’ status and whether this effect is influenced by 
participants’ cultural background. We hypothesized that participants within an 
individualistic culture provide more autonomy-oriented help to a help seeker with a high 
SES and more dependency-oriented help to a help seeker with low SES. For participants 
within a collectivistic culture we expected that the help seeker’s SES should not affect the 
kind of provided help.  
 
4.5.1 Method 
Country selection. 
The countries in Study 4.3 were chosen on the same basis as in Study 4.1. 
Participants and Design. 
To test our predictions the participants participated in a 2 (cultural background: 
individualistic vs. collectivist culture) × 2 (help seeker’s SES: low vs. high) between-
subjects design study. We manipulated the factor ‘help seeker’s SES experimentally, 
whereas the factor ‘cultural background’ was quasi-experimental. The total sample 
consisted of 161 participants. Participants were recruited via e-mail lists and received no 
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payment for participating. However, 9 participants failed to complete the study. Hence, 
the final sample consisted of 152 participants (74 Germans and 78 Turks). The German 
sub-sample consisted of 44 females and 29 males. The Turkish sub-sample consisted of 
36 females and 41 males. The participants’ age ranged from 17 to 75 (M = 28.28, SD = 
11.01). Participants were similarly distributed across conditions. 
Procedure and Scales. 
The procedure and used scales were very similar to those in Study 4.1 and 2. In 
short, participants had been informed that were participating in an online study about 
interaction while working on a problem solving task. Given that the IMC did not affect 
the results in Study 4.2 we decided to drop it. As in Study 4.1 and 2, participants had to 
fill out a demographic questionnaire and were informed that would work with a 30-year-
old German man, respectively Turkish man, who had either a high SES, or a low SES. 
The procedure and scales were identical to Study 4.1 with the following exceptions.  
In Study 4.3 we manipulated the help seeker’s SES via intelligence (IQ is strongly 
correlated with SES (e.g., Jencks, 1972; Gottfredson, 2004; Scarr, 1997). Participants 
were either informed that the problem solver had an IQ of 120 (high SES condition), or 
an IQ of 80 (low SES condition). Participants in both sub-samples were randomly 
assigned to either the high, or the low SES condition, respectively. Additionally, we kept 
the status difference between the participants and the problem solver constant. We did 
this via a fake IQ-test. Participants had been informed after the demographic 
questionnaire that they had to fill out an IQ-test to ‘match them with a suitable partner’. 
All participants had to work on some filler IQ-tasks. After the participants had finished 
the fake IQ-test, they were informed that they had an IQ of 100. 
As in Study 4.1 and 4.2 participants had to rate the problem solver’s performance 
expectations (α = .61) as a manipulation check. Helping responses, general ability (α = 
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.83), friendliness (α = .96), attraction (α = .88), and suspicion were assessed in the same 
way as in Study 4.1 and 4.2. As in the above studies, participants were asked whether 
they had participated in a similar study; and whether they had an idea about the purpose 
of the study as a suspicion check. Finally, participants were thanked for participating and 
fully debriefed about the study according to APA ethical standards.  
 
4.5.2 Results  
Manipulation and suspicion checks. 
A 2 (SES: high vs. low) × 2 (culture: individualistic vs. collectivistic) ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of the factor SES, F(1,149) = 8.27, p = .005, η² = .054. Participants 
rated the performance expectation of the problem solver higher in the high SES condition 
(M = 3.94, SD = 0.83) than in the low SES condition (M = 3.52, SD = 0.94). However, 
the ANOVA revealed neither a main effect of the factor culture, F(1,149) = 0.16, p = . 
688, η² < .01, nor the two-way interaction, F(1,149) = 0.12, p = .729, η² < .01, was 
significant.  
Thus it can be assumed that status successfully manipulated the perceived SES of 
the problem solver, independent of the participants’ cultural background. No participant 
indicated that she or he had participated in a similar study. Furthermore, no participant 
named the actual purpose of the study. 
Check for interfering effects. 
We checked for the same interfering effects as in Study 4.1 and 4.2. A chi-square 
test revealed no difference between countries’ readiness to help, χ² (1, N = 150) = 2.03, p 
= .168. Women’s readiness to help the problem solver did not differ from the men’s 
readiness, χ² (1, N = 150) = 1.50, p = .245. Furthermore, a series of 2 (SES: high vs. low) 
× 2 (culture: individualistic vs. collectivistic) ANOVAs revealed neither main effects of 
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the factor SES, nor culture, nor significant two-way interactions on the perceived 
problem’s solver general ability, friendliness, and attraction. 
Helping responses. 
The overall readiness to help was high; 78.7% of the participants were ready to 
help independent of the help seeker’s SES. A three-way loglinear analysis produced a 
final model that retained all effects. The likelihood of this model was χ² (0) = 0, p = 1. 
This indicated that the highest-order interaction (the help seeker’s SES × culture × kind of 
help interaction) was significant, χ² (1) = 4.11, p = .019. To break down this effect, 
separate chi-square tests on the help seeker’s SES and kind of provided help variables 
were performed separately for the individualistic and the collectivistic culture. For the 
individualistic culture there was a significant association between the help seeker’s SES 
and what kind of help the help seeker received, χ² (1) = 13.67, p < .001. However, for the 
collectivistic culture there was no significant association between the help seeker’s SES 
and what kind of help the help seeker received, χ² (1) = 0.81, p = .370.  
Odds ratio indicated that the odds of receiving autonomy-oriented help for a help 
seeker with high SES were 2.78 times higher in the individualistic culture, but only 1.38 
in the collectivistic culture. Moreover, odds ratio indicated that the odds of receiving 
dependency-oriented help for a help seeker with low SES were 2.86 times higher in the 
individualistic culture, but only 1.17 in the collectivistic culture (for the distribution of 
helping frequencies in the dependence of the help seeker’s SES see Figure 4.3).  
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Figure 4.3. Type of help provided  
 
 
 
frequency: autonomy vs. dependency oriented based on help seeker’s SES and 
participants’ cultural background. 
Note. Frequency distributions are based on the participants who decided to help.  
 
 
4.5.3 Discussion 
Study 4.3 replicated the findings of Study 4.1 and 2 and provide additional 
support for the hypothesis that participants in the high SES condition provided more 
autonomy-oriented help to the help seeker, whereas participants in the low SES condition 
provided more dependency-oriented help in the individualistic culture. These effects were 
only observed in the individualistic culture and not in the collectivistic culture. 
Additionally, Study 4.3 demonstrates convergent validity for this claim by using a 
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different SES manipulation. Moreover, Study 4.3 extends Study 4.1 and 4.2 by keeping 
the difference between the participants’ SES and help seeker’s SES constant. 
 
4.6 General Discussion 
The results of the present research indicate that a help seeker’s perceived SES 
changes the kind of help that he or she will receive. However, this effect is qualified by 
people’s cultural background. In societies which score high on individualism, help 
seeker’s social status strongly affects the type of help they will receive. High-SES 
individuals (e.g., having a high IQ, working in a prestigious profession) will more often 
receive autonomy-oriented help (e.g., a detailed explanation of how to solve a 
mathematical problem), whereas low-SES individuals (e.g., having a low IQ, working in 
a non-prestigious profession) receive dependency-oriented help (e.g., only the solution to 
a mathematical problem). This effect also occurs to a lesser extent in societies on the 
mid-level of the individualism-collectivism continuum. In contrast, in collectivistic 
societies the SES of a help seeker does not affect the kind of help that he or she will 
receive.  
Converging validity for these effects is increased by the two different SES 
conceptualizations. In the first and second study SES was manipulated on the basis of 
profession; in the third study SES was manipulated by intelligence. Additionally, 
participants always rated high SES help seekers higher on the perceived SES than low 
SES help seekers independent of their cultural background. 
The present research contributes to a better understanding of helping behavior. 
First, in line with Nadler and Chernyak-Hai (2014), we argue that it is not sufficient to 
put the focus only on the binary decision to provide help, because future research could 
miss important information about the impact of the helping behavior. Focusing on type of 
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help provided identifies social inequality: help seekers with a low SES receives 
dependency-oriented help, whereas help seekers with a high SES receive autonomy-
oriented help. In other words, if a low status person only receives dependency-oriented 
help he or she will not be able to improve his or her status, whereas a high status person 
receives autonomy-oriented help he or she will be able to increase its status. Thus it is 
important to focus on the kind of help a person will receive. 
Second, the present research indicates that interpersonal determinants of helping 
behavior (i.e., SES) should not be interpreted without taking participants’ cultural 
background into consideration. Previous research on the impact of a help seeker’s SES on 
helping behavior (e.g., Bickman, 1971; Goodman & Gareis, 1993; Solomon & Herman, 
1977) revealed that a low status person receives less help than a high status person. 
However, little is known about whether SES has a different impact on the kind of 
provided help in different cultures. The present research contributes to better understand 
this interplay between a help seeker’s SES and helping behavior in different cultures. 
Some might argue that the present research did not replicate the finding that high 
status persons receive more help than low status persons, however this can be explained 
in a way that in the cited studies participants had to help strangers, whereas in the present 
research participants were informed that studies are about interactions, hence the target 
persons were not strangers any more. Moreover, our results are in line with Nadler and 
Chernyak-Hai’s (2014) findings. 
From a practical point of view, the present research can be implicated in several 
ways. First, the results of the present research can contribute to a reduction of social 
inequality, especially in individualistic societies. The APA Task Force on SES report 
(APA, 2007) indicated that reducing social inequality based on SES is a central topic in 
psychology, because social inequality affects critical domains in life (i.e., health, 
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education, and human welfare). For example, Fiscella and Franks (1997) found that 
people who have a low family income (low SES) have higher mortality risk than people 
with a high family income (high SES). In line with Fiscella and Franks’ (1997) findings, 
Gottfredson (2004) revealed that people with a low IQ have a higher mortality risk than 
those with a high IQ. Therefore, the application of the present research findings’ can 
contribute to a reduction of social inequality by high lightening the importance of the 
kind of provided help.  
Second, these results can contribute to better performance in work groups, 
especially international groups, by improving the way that knowledge is shared. 
According to Cummings (2004), knowledge sharing is an important predictor of the 
performance of work groups. Imagine a work group which consists of members who have 
a different cultural background and members who have a different SES. For example, this 
work group has to work on an algorithm and one low SES member who has problems 
programing a formula asks another member, who has an individualistic cultural 
background, for help. If this member just provides the formula (dependency-oriented 
help), the help seeking member will not be able improve his on her skills. As a 
consequence, the help seeking member has to ask again for help if he or she has to work 
on similar tasks instead of solving it by himself or herself. Therefore, the performance of 
the whole work group will be decreased. However, if the person who was asked for help 
would have had provided autonomy-oriented help, the help seeker would not have had to 
ask again and therefore, more resources would have been left for other tasks. 
Nevertheless, the current studies have several limitations. First, culture was only 
operationalized through individualism-collectivism. It cannot be ruled out that focusing 
on other cultural dimension (i.e., power distance) could have changed the results. 
Therefore, future research should examine whether the same results occur when the 
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cultural comparison is based on different culture dimensions, or different 
conceptualizations of culture.  
Second, some might argue that basing cultural comparisons on a national level can 
be problematic. For example, Peterson and Smith (2008) argued that individuals show 
substantial within-country variance and that countries have regional, ethnic, and other 
subcultures. However, Minkov and Hofstede (2012) argued that when national cultures 
are compared, it does not matter whether individual differences are large and whether 
they are larger or smaller than national differences. Furthermore, they found that cultural 
values cluster along national lines more rather than be scattered and intermixed with the 
regions of other countries in the same cultural or geographic area. This logic is in line 
with Schwartz’s (2008) findings. He assessed consistency in the relative scores of 
countries on cultural orientations by comparing three types of subgroups (i.e., younger vs. 
older participants, females vs. males, and teachers vs. students) and found high 
correlations between the subgroups.  
Third, individualism-collectivism may not be unidimensional (for a 
comprehensive review of this topic see: Taras et al., 2014). However, Taras et al.’s meta-
analysis revealed a negative correlation between individualism and collectivism, and this 
indicates a unidimensional structure.  
Fourth, we encourage future research to examine SES within existing hierarchal 
structures (i.e., organizational settings). Fifth, given that we did not assess underlying 
processes future research should investigate them. Furthermore, future research should 
could address the question whether the effects of the present research can be observed for 
immigrants who moved from an individualistic to a collectivistic culture, or vice versa, 
because Dinesen (2012) found that first-generation immigrants who moved from low-
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trust to a high-trust country are strongly affected by the levels of trust in the destination 
country.  
To sum up, the results of the present research supports the idea that the type of 
help-seeking behavior is important and can reveal structural inequalities based on SES 
and culture. Furthermore, the present research highlights the importance of the interplay 
between interpersonal and cultural predictors of helping behavior. If individuals want to 
reduce social inequality by helping others, they should not only ask themselves whether 
to help, but also how best to help.  
 
5 General Discussion 
 
 
5.1 Summary  
The aim of the present thesis is to provide a deeper understanding of the interplay 
of different factors to predict helping behavior in an accurate and effective way. To be 
more specific, the present thesis focuses on (a) the impact of present bystanders on the 
willingness to help, (b) the interplay between the perception of a victim’s responsibility for 
his plight; the type of helping behavior; and the relationship between the helper and the 
victim, and its effect on the readiness to help, and (c) the impact of a help seeker’s status 
on the kind of help the he or she will receive in different cultures. 
Chapter 2 provided an encompassing review of the bystander literature. This 
literature review indicated that the bystander effect seems to be a robust effect (i.e., that the 
willingness to help others in need is decreased by the presence of passive bystanders). 
However, Chapter 2 also provided evidence that under specific conditions the bystander 
effect sometimes decreases, vanishes or can even be reversed. To be more specific, the 
bystander effect occurs mainly in low-cost helping situations (e.g., helping somebody to 
pick up accidently dropped items). However, the bystander effect decreases in situations in 
which people feel a high personal involvement. For example, people show typical 
bystander behavior when somebody is drawing a graffiti in a shopping mall’s elevator, 
whereas if somebody litters a neighborhood park the bystander effect reduces. 
Furthermore, the bystander effect vanishes when a bystander and a victim belong to the 
same social category. Finally, the bystander effect reverses in high-cost helping situations 
(i.e., in moral courage scenarios). 
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The purpose of the studies presented in Chapter 3 is to investigate the interplay of 
perceived responsibility for being in a plight, the relationship between a helper and a 
victim, and the kind of helping situations. Study 3.1 aimed to systematically investigate 
this interplay based on McGuire’s (1994) taxonomy of different helping behaviors. The 
results of Study 3.1 revealed that people were more likely to help persons in need when 
they were perceived as not being responsible for their plight. This effect was only observed 
in low-cost helping situations (i.e., casual helping and substantial personal helping). 
Whereas, for emotional helping and emergency helping (i.e., higher-cost helping 
situations) people’s helping intentions were not influenced by responsibility judgments. A 
similar pattern could be observed for the relationship between the person in need and the 
help giver. In low-cost helping situations people are more willing to help close relatives 
than acquaintances, whereas no such effect occurred in higher-cost helping situations.  
Furthermore, Study 3.2 aimed to extend the findings of Study 3.1 by including a 
moral courage scenario. Study 3.2 showed, in line with the result of Study 3.1, that 
people’s willingness to help decreases when persons in need are perceived as being 
responsible for their plight. This effect was only observed in lower-cost helping situations. 
However, for moral courage situations and life-or-death-scenarios people’s helping 
intentions were not influenced by responsibility judgments. Overall, Study 3.2 showed that 
participants’ willingness to help a person in need was increased in high-cost helping 
situations.  
Therefore, Study 3.3 aimed to clarify the underlying psychological process which 
could explain why people are willing to help others in need the more dangerous a situation 
is. Study 3.3 revealed that the willingness to help is partly driven by accepted costs for 
helping a person in need. In line with Fischer et al.’s (2006) findings, Study 3.3 showed 
that the more dangerous a situation becomes people accept higher costs for helping and as 
consequence people are more willing to help a person in need.  
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Taken together, the findings of Studies 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 indicate that people’s 
willingness to help others can partially be predicted by Weiner’s (1980) attribution theory. 
To be more specific, across the studies of Chapter 3 people were more likely to help a 
person in need when they were perceived as not being responsible for their plight. This 
effect was only observed in low-cost helping situations, however, for higher-cost helping 
situations, such as moral courage and life-or-death scenarios, people’s helping intentions 
were not influenced by responsibility judgments. Additionally, these studies revealed that 
kinship does not have a particularly strong impact on helping, in contrast to the suggestions 
of Burnstein et al. (1994). It instead seems that the tendency to help can be better predicted 
by the type of helping behavior itself than by the relationship between the helper and the 
person in need. 
Chapter 4 dealt with the question whether a help seeker’s status differently affects 
the kind of help he or she will receive in different cultures (i.e., individualistic vs. 
collectivistic cultures). Study 4.1 aimed to clarify the question what kind of help (i.e. 
dependency-oriented vs. autonomy-oriented) participants provide to help seekers 
depending on the help seekers’ status. Moreover, Study 4.1 was designed to examine 
whether this effect is influenced by the participants’ cultural background (i.e. 
individualistic vs. collectivistic). The results of Study 4.1 revealed that a help seeker with a 
high SES received more autonomy-oriented help, and a help seeker with a low SES 
received more dependency-oriented help, but only in the individualistic culture. No 
changes in help type occurred in the collectivistic culture as a function of SES.  
Study 4.2 aimed to replicate and to extend the findings of Study 4.1 by comparing a 
highly individualistic culture with a culture on the mid-level of individualism-collectivism 
continuum. Study 4.2 showed that participants in the high SES condition provide more 
autonomy-oriented help to a help seeker, whereas participants in the low SES condition 
provide more dependency-oriented help. Moreover, Study 2 revealed that this effect is 
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bigger in the U.S (a highly individualistic culture) compared to India (mid-level on 
individualism-collectivism). Study 4.3 was designed to extend the findings of Study 4.1 
and 4.2 by holding the status between help seeker and help giver constant. Again, Study 
4.3 revealed that help seekers with a low SES receive more dependency-oriented help, 
whereas help seekers with a high SES receive more autonomy oriented help, but only in 
the individualistic culture. No such effect is present in the collectivistic culture as a 
function of SES. 
 
5.2 Implications of the Present Thesis 
The results of the present thesis provide a deeper understanding of the interplay of 
different factors to predict helping behavior in an accurate and effective way. Furthermore, 
these results have major theoretical and practical implications for the research on helping 
behavior. Given that the specific implications of the impact of the interplay between 
perceptions of a victim’s responsibility for their plight, the type of helping behavior, and 
the relationship between the helper and the victim, on the readiness to help somebody who 
is a plight, and the impact of a help seeker’s status on the kind of help the he or she will 
receive in different cultures, were discussed in the previous chapters, this section focuses 
on the overall theoretical and practical implications of the present research. 
 
5.2.1 Theoretical Added Value 
First, the results of the present thesis provide important theoretical implications for 
research on helping behavior. Even though previous research has provided great insights to 
the question why people are more willing to help a person in need if he or she is ‘innocent’ 
for his or her plight (e.g., Betancourt, 1990; Meyer and Mulherin, 1980; Weiner, 1980, 
1996; Zucker & Weiner, 1993), the present thesis reveals that people’s willingness to help 
can partly be explained by attribution theory.  
General Discussion   105 
 
Across three studies, Chapter 3 indicates that people are more likely to help a 
person in need when they are perceived as not being responsible for his or her plight in 
low-cost helping situations (e.g., lending someone your notes/books, helping a person to 
clean his house, covering for a friend’s rent). However, no such effect can be observed in 
high-cost helping situations (e.g., defending somebody from physical attack, intervening in 
a case of sexual harassment, saving somebody from a certain death).  
Secondly, the findings of three studies (Study 3.1, 3.2., and 3.3) indicate that 
kinship does not have a particularly strong impact on helping intentions, in contrast to the 
suggestions of Burnstein et al. (1994). To be more precise, the results of the present thesis 
show that evolutionary theory (i.e., kin-selection theory) can predict helping intentions 
only in low-cost helping scenarios, such as casual and substantial personal helping 
situations. However, in high-cost helping scenarios (i.e., moral-courage and life-or-death 
situations) kin-selection theory seems not be able to predict helping intensions. Instead, the 
present thesis proposes that the tendency to help can be better predicted by the type of 
helping behavior itself than by the relationship between the helper and the person in need. 
The current results show that people’s helping intentions increase the more dangerous a 
helping situation becomes. But how can this, on the first sight, counterintuitive 
phenomenon be explained?  
High-cost helping situations (e.g., someone getting attacked by a fierce looking 
perpetrator, a serious car crash on the motorway) are understood to require intervention 
more quickly and clearly than low-cost helping situations (e.g., Fischer et al., 2011; 
Greitemeyer et al., 2006). Thus, people’s costs for not helping a person in need increase. In 
turn, these increased costs lead to an unpleasant arousal for people who are witnessing a 
high-cost helping situation. An effective way to decrease this unpleasant arousal is to help 
the person in need. This way of arguing is in line with Dovidio et al.’s (1991) arousal: cost-
reward model which proposes that arousal emerges by witnessing another person’s 
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distress, whereas the degree of arousal is directly related to the clarity and severity of a 
helping situation. 
Thirdly, although the current thesis provides valuable insight to predict whether 
someone is willing to become active for another person in need, this thesis also indicates 
that it is not sufficient to focus only on the binary decision whether someone will receive 
help or not. In line with Nadler and Chernyak-Hai’s (2014) findings, the presented studies 
in Chapter 4 reveal that people receive a different kind of help depending on their SES. To 
be more specific, people with a low SES (e.g., working in non-prestigious professions, or 
having low IQ) receive more dependency-oriented help (e.g., someone receives only the 
solution for a mathematical problem), whereas people with high SES (e.g., working in 
prestigious professions, or having high IQ) receive more autonomy-oriented help (e.g., 
receiving the tools to solve a mathematical problem). However, as showed in Study 4.1, 
Study 4.2., and Study 4.3, this phenomenon mainly occurs in individualistic societies 
whereas a help seeker’s SES does not seem to have such a strong impact on the kind of 
provided help. 
Fourthly, the results of this thesis also indicate that helping behavior is affected by 
people’s cultural background. To be more specific, the studies presented in Chapter 4 
show that if people in individualistic cultures are asked for help, their decision on what 
kind of help they offer is influenced by a help seeker’s SES, whereas in collectivistic 
cultures this does not seem to be the case. Having this fact on mind, how can this finding 
be explained?  
According to Hofstede (1980, 2001), people who live in individualistic societies are 
supposed to take care of themselves and their immediate families only, and people’s self-
image is defined in terms of “I”. In contrast to people who live in collectivistic societies 
they expect that their ingroup will look after them, and in exchange for that they owe 
absolute loyalty to their ingroup. In such a society people’s self-image is defined in terms 
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of “we”. Therefore, people in individualistic cultures base their decision on what kind of 
help they offer on a help seeker’s SES, whereas in collectivistic societies, people do not 
base their decision on a help seeker’s SES. This way of arguing is in line with Schwartz’s 
(1994, 2008) findings on culture value orientation (i.e., autonomy vs. embeddedness in 
societies).  
In cultures with an emphasis on autonomy people are viewed as autonomous 
entities, are encouraged to show off their abilities, encouraged to pursue positive 
experiences, and encouraged to pursue their own ideas and intellectual directions 
independently. In contrast to cultures with an emphasis on embeddedness. In those cultures 
people are viewed as entities embedded in the collective, are giving meaning to their life 
largely through shared goals, and emphasize on maintaining the status quo and restraining 
actions that might disrupt ingroup solidarity or the traditional order (Schwartz, 1994, 
2008). 
Fifth, the results of the present research contribute to a better understanding of 
inequality and hence they can also lead to a reduction of inequality in the long run. For 
example, somebody asks you if you would be willing to cover his or her rent because he or 
she is short of money. Now imagine that the person who asks you for money mentions that 
he or she is short of money because he or she spent money on something unnecessary, or 
that he or she is short of money because he or she spent money to repay the loan for the car 
the person needs for going to his or her job. According to attribution theory (e.g., Weiner, 
1980, 1996), people are less willing to help the person in the first scenario because the 
person in need is perceived as being responsible for being in a plight.  
On the contrary, in the second scenario people are more willing to help in as much 
as the person in need is perceived as being ‘innocent’ for the plight. But what if the person 
in the first scenario was simply too shy to mention that he or she had purchased its car on 
credit? In both scenarios the level of responsibility for being in a plight is at the same level, 
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but only the second scenario the person will receive help. This circumstance can lead to 
more inequality, because the person may not be able to repay the loan and as a 
consequence he or she might have to return the car, which in turn could lead to a job loss.  
Moreover, the APA Task Force on SES report (APA, 2007) showed that gaps in 
income and wealth continue to widen and that they are reaching record heights. These gaps 
are even getting wider if they are considered in terms of their consequences for access to 
goods and services. Given that income is related to education and knowledge (e.g., APA, 
2007), one way to close this gap is to provide better education and more knowledge to 
underprivileged people. Imagine that an underprivileged person asks somebody for help to 
solve a mathematical equation and this person only provides the solution then the person in 
need will not be able to improve its skills. However, if the asked person would have 
provided the way to get to the solution, the person in need would have been able to 
improve his or her skills. Which in turn could lead to a reduction of inequality. The 
practical implications section will cover a detailed discussion of how this knowledge can 
be applied. 
To sum up, the results of the present research suggest that the best way to predict 
helping intentions and the impact of different types of helping behavior in an accurate and 
effective way is to focus on the interplay of different factors.  
  
 
5.2.2 Practical Added Value 
The application of the findings of this thesis can lead to reduction of social 
inequality (i.e., in individualistic societies). For example, the application of the present 
results can reduce social inequality that is based on education. This is crucial since 
education is one of the critical domains in life (e.g., Hochschild, 2003). Imagine again that 
an underprivileged student asks a classmate if he or she could provide some help to solve a 
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mathematical equation. If the classmate decides to respond to the help request only with 
the solution for the equation (dependency-oriented help), the unprivileged student will not 
be able to improve his or her skills. Thus, the unprivileged student will remain at the same 
low status.  
On the contrary, if a privileged student would have had problems solving the same 
equations, his or her classmate would have provided the way how to get to the solution 
(autonomy-oriented help). Thus, the privileged student will even be able to increase his or 
her status. In the long run, this fact leads to an increased inequality. Therefore, it is 
important to keep in mind how to help, independent of the perceived SES of a help-seeker. 
In the same vein, the application of this thesis’s results can lead to less inequality in 
work environments. Following the logic of the previous example, employees with a low 
SES (e.g., they are perceived as less intelligent than others) will not be able to increase 
their work-based knowledge, hence they will mostly receive dependency-oriented help. 
Moreover, low SES employees may receive less help on the job in as much as they are 
perceived as being responsible for their plight. Therefore, low SES employees may not get 
promoted or, in the worst case, they can lose their job due to their bad job performance.  
Moreover, the present research’s results can be used to increase work teams’ 
efficacy by improving the communication within work teams. Previous research has shown 
that well-functioning communication is a crucial predictor for a work team’s efficacy (e.g., 
Srivastava, Bartol, & Locke, 2006). The current results can be applied to improve 
communication within work teams in two ways. First, in line with the results of attribution 
theory (e.g., Betancourt, 1990; Meyer and Mulherin, 1980; Weiner, 1980, 1996; Zucker & 
Weiner, 1993), the findings of this thesis has revealed that people in low-cost helping 
situations will receive less help if they are perceived as being responsible for their plight.  
In a work environment these can be situations such as: giving advice to a colleague, 
explaining a new computer program, helping to organize a conference, et cetera. These are 
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all situations that are connected with work team efficacy. Therefore, if a team member is 
perceived as being ‘responsible’ for his or her plight (e.g., somebody is not able to use the 
newly implemented software tool because she or he missed the training due to a hang-over) 
the other team members will be less willing to share important knowledge. In turn, this 
lack of communication leads to a decreased work team capabilities and efficacy. Therefore, 
it is important that employees share knowledge and communicate with each other 
independent of whether a work team member is perceived as being ‘responsible” for his or 
her plight or not.  
Second, beyond putting the focus on whether people communicate or not, it is also 
crucial to focus on how team members communicate with each other in order to improve a 
work team’s efficacy. For example, an employee has some difficulties in doing a statistical 
analysis and he or she asks a workmate for help. If the workmate decides to help by doing 
the analysis for the person, this person will not be able to improve his or her skills. Thus, 
this person will not be able to do a similar analysis by itself, inasmuch as the person has to 
ask for help again, which in long run leads to a decreased work team efficacy. As a 
consequence of these findings, companies should provide communication training for their 
employees with a strong focus on how to communicate and share knowledge effectively in 
order to increase a work team’s efficacy. 
Finally, the results of the present research can also contribute to a better 
understanding of the willingness to support refugees. At the beginning of the big refugee 
wave in 2015, many German citizens openly and enthusiastically welcomed the arriving 
refugees. Beyond this, many Germans donated clothes, toys, hygiene products, and food. 
From an attribution theory point of view (e.g., Meyer and Mulherin, 1980; Weiner, 1996; 
Zucker & Weiner, 1993), this extraordinary helpfulness can may be explained in a way that 
those helpful people perceived the arriving refugees as being ‘innocent’ for their plight 
(i.e., in 2015, the most refugees fled from the civil war in Syria). However, after women 
General Discussion   111 
 
were disgracefully sexually assaulted allegedly by refugees during the 2016 New Year’s 
Eve celebrations in Cologne, Germany, the situation has changed.  
As a consequence of those attacks the willingness to help and welcome refugees 
dropped tremendously. This can be possibly explained by a change in people’s perception 
of refugees’ neediness. To be more precise, subsequent to those attacks refugees may not 
be perceived as being ‘innocent’ for their plight, instead people may perceive them as 
being ‘responsible’. Following the logic of Weiner’s (1980, 1996) attribution theory, this 
perception of being responsible leads to a decreased willingness to help, especially in low-
cost helping situations such as donating.  
  
5.3 Limitations   
Even though the results of the present thesis have provided new insight into the 
interplay of different factors to predict helping behavior in an accurate and effective way, 
this thesis has some limitations that need to be discussed. Given that the limitations of each 
chapter are already discussed in detail, this section will provide an overall discussion of the 
present research.  
The first point to mention is that the present research mainly gathered helping 
intentions and not real helping behavior. As a consequence, the present research has to be 
limited this way, although the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) does suggest that 
real behavior can adequately be predicted by assessing behavioral intentions. Nevertheless, 
future research should try to close this gap by examining helping behavior in the field, as 
far as this can be done without violating ethical standards, especially in moral courage or 
life-or-death scenarios.  
Another limitation is that the conducted studies were based on a limited selection of 
helping scenarios. Even though the used scenarios had been carefully selected, based on a 
taxonomy of helping situations (McGuire, 1994) and on scenarios that had been used in 
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previous studies (e.g., Greitemeyer et al., 2003; Nadler & Chernyak-Hai, 2014), they 
cannot cover the wide range of real world helping situations. Thus, future research should 
focus on replicating the current findings in a wide range of different helping scenarios. 
Additionally, it has to be mentioned that the present findings have to be limited in a 
way that long-term effects were not assessed. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that 
people’s intentions may be differently affected over time. For example, if a person cannot 
cover the rent due to thoughtless money spending, he or she will not receive help because 
he or she is perceived as being responsible for the plight. But it cannot be ruled out that the 
same person’s handling of money can change over time. Therefore, it would be advisable 
to investigate the question whether helping intentions change if a help-giver receives 
additional information about the help-seekers vita.  
Finally, it has to be mentioned that the current findings have limitations concerning 
their underlying psychological processes. It cannot be ruled out that the current findings 
might be driven by empathic concerns. To be more precise, previous research (e.g., Batson 
et al., 1988, 1991) has shown that people who have the willingness to help others in need is 
driven by empathic concerns. For example, empathic people help even if they know that 
the majority of other people do not help in a particular situation (Batson et al., 1988). As a 
consequence, future research should also examine whether the present findings can also be 
driven by empathic concerns.  
To sum up, although the present research has provided valuable insight to the 
question whether and how do people help, more research has to be done to provide an 
encompassing answer to this question.  
 
5.4 Future Directions  
The present dissertation aims to provide a deeper understanding of the interplay of 
different factors to predict helping behavior in an accurate and effective way. Especially, 
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the present thesis focuses on the interplay of factors (i.e., responsibility attributions, 
relationships between a person in need and a help giver, SES, and culture). The results 
show that helping behavior can accurately and effectively be predicted by focusing on the 
interplay of these factors. Therefore, the present results can be the starting point for an 
encompassing model to predict helping behavior. 
 
References 
 
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human 
 Decision Processes, 50(2), 179-211. doi: 10.1016/0749-5978(91)90020-T 
Allen, B. C., Sargent, L. D., & Bradley, L. M. (2003). Differential effects of task and 
 reward interdependence on perceived helping behavior, effort, and group 
 performance. Small Group Research, 34(6), 716-740.  
 doi: 10.1177/1046496403257615 
American Psychological Association, Task Force on Socioeconomic Status. (2007). 
 Report of the APA Task Force on Socioeconomic Status. Washington, DC: 
 American Psychological Association. 
Batson, C. D., Batson, J. G., Slingsby, J. K., Harrell, K. L., Peekna, H. M., & Todd, R. M. 
 (1991). Empathic joy and the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Journal of Personality 
 and Social Psychology, 61(3), 413-426. doi 10.1037/0022-3514.61.3.413 
Batson, C. D., Dyck, J. L., Brandt, J. R., Batson, J. G., Powell, A. L., McMaster, M. R., & 
 Griffitt, C. (1988). Five studies testing two new egoistic alternatives to the 
 empathy-altruism hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55(1), 
 52-77. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.55.1.52 
Batson, C. D., O'Quin, K., Fultz, J., Vanderplas, M., & Isen, A. M. (1983). Influence of 
 self-reported distress and empathy on egoistic versus altruistic motivation to help. 
 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45(3), 706-718.  
 doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.45.3.706 
Baumeister, R. F., Chesner, S. P., Senders, P. S., & Tice, D. M. (1988). Who’s in charge 
 here? Group leaders do lend help in emergencies. Personality and Social 
 Psychology Bulletin, 14, 17-22. doi: 10.1177/0146167288141002 
References  115 
Beaman, A. L., Barnes, P. J., Klentz, B., & McQuirk, B. (1978). Increasing helping rates 
 through information dissemination: Teaching pays. Personality and Social 
 Psychology Bulletin, 4(3), 406-411. doi: 10.1177/014616727800400309 
Betancourt, H. (1990). An attribution-empathy model of helping behavior behavioral 
 intentions and judgments of help-giving. Personality and Social Psychology 
 Bulletin, 16(3), 573-591. doi: 10.1177/0146167290163015 
Bickman, L. (1971). The effect of social status on the honesty of others. The Journal of 
 Social Psychology, 85(1), 87-92. doi: 10.1080/00224545.1971.9918547 
Bierhoff, H.-W. (2002). Theorien hilfreichen Verhaltens. In D. Frey & M. Irle (Eds.), 
 Theorien der Sozialpsychologie (Bd.II, pp. 178-197). Bern: Huber. 
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
 Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6, 3-5. doi: 10.1177/1745691610393980 
Burnstein, E., Crandall, C., & Kitayama, S. (1994). Some neo-Darwinian decision rules for 
 altruism: Weighing cues for inclusive fitness as a function of the biological 
 importance of the decision. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(5), 
 773-789. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.67.5.773 
Brickman, P. B., Rabinowitz, V. C., Karuza, J., Coates, D., Cohn, E., & Kidder, L. (1982). 
 Models of helping and coping. American Psychologist, 37, 368–384.  
 doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.37.4.368 
Chekroun, P., & Brauer, M. (2002). The bystander effect and social control behavior: the 
 effect of the presence of others on people’s reaction to norm violations. European 
 Journal of Social Psychology, 32, 853-867. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.126 
Clark, R. D., & Word, L. E. (1972). Why don't bystanders help? Because of ambiguity?. 
 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 24(3), 392-400.  
 doi:10.1037/h0033717 
References  116 
Cummings, J. N. (2004). Work groups, structural diversity, and knowledge sharing in a 
 global  organization. Management Science, 50(3), 352-364.  
 doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1030.0134 
Curry, R. L. (1988). Influence of kinship on helping behavior in Galapagos mockingbirds. 
 Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 22(2), 141-152. doi: 10.1007/BF00303549 
Darley, J. M., & Batson, C. D. (1973). "From Jerusalem to Jericho": A study of situational 
 and dispositional variables in helping behavior. Journal of Personality and Social 
 Psychology, 27(1), 100-108. doi: 10.1037/h0034449 
Deutsch, F. M., & Lamberti, D. M. (1986). Does social approval increase helping. 
 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 12(2), 149-157.  
 doi: 10.1177/0146167286122001 
Dinesen, P. T. (2012). Does generalized (dis)trust travel? Examining the impact of cultural 
 heritage and destination country environment on trust of immigrants. Political 
 Psychology, 33, 495-511. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00886.x 
Dovidio, J. F., Piliavin, J. A., Gaertner, S. L., Schroeder, D. A., & Clark, R. D. (1991). The 
 arousal: Cost-reward model and the process of intervention: A review of the 
 evidence. Review of Personality and Social Psychology, 12, 83-118. 
Dovidio, J. F., Piliavin, J. A., Schroeder, D. A., & Penner, L. (2006). The social 
 psychology of  prosocial behavior. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. 
Eagly, A. H., & Crowley, M. (1986). Gender and Helping Behavior: A Meta-Analytic 
 Review of the Social Psychological Literature. Psychological Bulletin, 100(3),  
 283-308. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.100.3.283 
Eisenberg, N., & Fabes, R. (1998). Prosocial development. In W. Damon (Editor-in-Chief) 
 & N. Eisenberg (Vol. Ed.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 3. Social, 
 emotional, and personality development (5th ed., pp.701-778). New York: Wiley. 
References  117 
Eisenberg, N., & Fabes, R. A. (1991). Prosocial behavior and empathy: A multimethod 
 developmental perspective. In M. S. Clark (Ed.), Review of personality and social 
 psychology: Vol. 12. Prosocial behavior (pp. 34-61). Thousand Oaks, CA, US: 
 Sage Publications. 
Epstein, Y. M., & Hornstein, H. A. (1969). Penalty and interpersonal attraction as factors 
 influencing the decision to help another person. Journal of Experimental Social 
 Psychology, 5(3), 272-282. doi: 10.1016/0022-1031(69)90053-5 
Essock-Vitale, S. M., & McGuire, M. T. (1985). Women's lives viewed from an 
 evolutionary perspective. II. Patterns of helping. Ethology and Sociobiology, 6(3),  
 155-173. doi: 10.1016/0162-3095(85)90028-7 
Euler, H. A., Hoier, S., & Rohde, P. A. (2001). Relationship-specific closeness of 
 intergenerational family ties findings from evolutionary psychology and 
 implications for models of cultural transmission. Journal of Cross-Cultural 
 Psychology, 32(2), 147-158. doi: 10.1177/0022022101032002003 
Fiscella, K., and P. Franks. 1997. "Poverty or Income Inequality as Predictor of 
 Mortality: Longitudinal Cohort Study." British Medical Journal, 314, 1724-1728.  
 doi: 10.1136/bmj.314.7096.1724 
Fischer, P., & Greitemeyer, T. (2013). The Positive Bystander Effect: Passive Bystanders 
 Increase Helping in Situations With High Expected Negative Consequences for the 
 Helper. The Journal of Social Psychology, 153(1), 1-5.  
 doi: 10.1080/00224545.2012.697931 
Fischer, P., Greitemeyer, T., Pollozek, F., & Frey, D. (2006). The unresponsive bystander: 
 Are bystanders more responsive in dangerous emergencies?. European Journal of 
 Social Psychology, 36(2), 267-278. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.297 
References  118 
Fischer, P., Greitemeyer, T., Schulz-Hardt, S., Frey, D., Jonas, E., & Rudukha, T. (2004).
 Zivilcourage und Hilfeverhalten: Der Einfluss negative Konsequenzen auf die 
 Wahrnehmung prosozialen Verhaltens. Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie, 35, 61-66. 
Fischer, P., Krueger, J., Greitemeyer, T., Kastenmüller, A., Vogrincic, C., Frey, D . . .
 Kainbacher, M. (2011). The bystander-effect: A meta-analytic review on bystander
 intervention in dangerous and non-dangerous emergencies. Psychological Bulletin, 
 137, 517-537. doi: 10.1037/a0023304 
Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (1977). The subtlety of White racism, arousal, and helping 
 behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35(10), 691-707.  
 doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.35.10.691 
Ganzeboom, H. B., De Graaf, P. M., & Treiman, D. J. (1992). A standard international 
 socio-economic index of occupational status. Social Science Research, 21(1), 1-56.  
 doi: 10.1016/0049-089X(92)90017-B 
Garcia, S. M., Weaver, K., Darley, J. M., & Spence, B. T. (2009). Dual effects of implicit 
 bystanders: Inhibiting vs. facilitating helping behavior. Journal of Consumer 
 Psychology, 19(2), 215-224. doi: 10.1016/j.jcps.2009.02.013 
Garcia, S. M., Weaver, K., Moskowitz, G. B., & Darley, J. M. (2002). Crowded minds: 
 The implicit bystander effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 
 843-853. doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.83.4.843 
Goodman, M. D., & Gareis, K. C. (1993). The influence of status on decisions to help. The 
 Journal of Social Psychology, 133(1), 23-31. doi: 10.1080/00224545.1993.9712115 
Gottfredson, L. S. (2004). Intelligence: is it the epidemiologists' elusive" fundamental 
 cause" of social class inequalities in health?. Journal of Personality and Social 
 Psychology, 86(1), 174-199. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.86.1.174 
References  119 
Grant, A. M., & Gino, F. (2010). A little thanks goes a long way: Explaining why gratitude 
 expressions motivate prosocial behavior. Journal of Personality and Social 
 Psychology, 98, 946–955. doi: 10.1037/a0017935 
Greitemeyer, T., Fischer, P., Kastenmüller, A., & Frey, D. (2006). Civil courage and 
 helping behavior: Differences and similarities. European Psychologist, 11, 90-98. 
 doi: 10.1027/1016-9040.11.2.90 
Greitemeyer, T., Osswald, S., Fischer, P., & Frey, D. (2007). Civil courage: Implicit 
 theories, related concepts, and measurement. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 
 2(2), 115-119. doi: 10.1080/17439760701228789 
Greitemeyer, T., Rudolph, U., & Weiner, B. (2003). Whom would you rather help: An 
 acquaintance not responsible for her plight or a responsible sibling?. The Journal of 
 Social Psychology, 143(3), 331-340. doi: 10.1080/00224540309598448 
Halabi, S., & Nadler, A. (2010). Receiving help: Consequences for the recipient. In S. 
 Sturmer & M. Snyder (eds.). The psychology of prosocial behavior: Group 
 processes, intergroup relations and helping (pp. 121–138). Hoboken, N.J.:  
 Wiley-Blackwell.  
Harari, H., Harari, O., & White, R. V. (1985). The reaction to rape by American male 
 bystanders. The Journal of Social Psychology, 125,653–658.  
 doi: 10.1080/00224545.1985.9712039 
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional Process 
 Analysis: A Regression-Based Approach. Guilford Press. 
Hayes, A. F., & Preacher, K. J. (2014). Statistical mediation analysis with a 
 multicategorical independent variable. British Journal of Mathematical and 
 Statistical Psychology, 67(3), 451-470. doi: 10.1111/bmsp.12028 
References  120 
Hebl, M. R., & Mannix, L. M. (2003). The weight of obesity in evaluating others: A mere 
 proximity effect. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29(1), 28-38. 
 doi: 10.1177/0146167202238369 
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., ... & Tracer, D. (2005). 
 “Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-
 scale societies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(6), 795-815.  
 doi: 10.1017/S0140525X05000142 
Hochschild, J. L. (2003). Social class in public schools. Journal of Social Issues, 59(4), 
 821-840. doi: 10.1046/j.0022-4537.2003.00092.x 
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related 
 Values. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, 
 and organizations across nations (2nd ed.). Beverly Hills CA: Sage. 
Hornsey, M. J. (2008). Social identity theory and self‐categorization theory: A historical 
 review. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2(1), 204-222.  
 doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2007.00066.x 
Hornstein, H. A. (1972). Promotive tension and prosocial behavior: The basis of prosocial 
 behavior from a Lewinian perspective. Journal of Social Issues, 28, 191-218.  
 doi: 10.1111/j.1540-4560.1972.tb00039.x 
Horowitz, I. A. (1971). The effect of group norms on bystander intervention. The Journal 
 of Social Psychology, 83, 265–273. doi: 10.1080/00224545.1971.9922471 
Jencks, C. (1972). Inequality: A reassessment of the effect of family and schooling in 
 America. New York: Basic Books. 
Johnson, D. E., Erez, A., Kiker, D. S., & Motowidlo, S. J. (2002). Liking and attributions 
 of motives as mediators of the relationships between individuals' reputations, 
References  121 
 helpful behaviors and raters' reward decisions. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
 87(4), 808-815. doi: 10.1037//0021-9010.87.4.808 
Jonas, K. J., & Brandstätter, V. (2004). Brennpunkt Zivilcourage: Definition, Befunde und 
 Maßnahmen. Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie, 35, 185-200. 
Knafo, A., Schwartz, S. H., & Levine, R. V. (2009). Helping strangers is lower in 
 embedded cultures. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 40(5), 875-879.  
 doi: 10.1177/0022022109339211 
Kojima, M. (1992). An analysis of attributional processes in helping behavior. Bulletin of 
 the Tamagawa Gakuen Junior College for Women, 17, 57-83.  
Kozlov, M. D., & Johansen, M. K. (2010). Real behavior in virtual environments: 
 Psychology experiments in a simple virtual-reality paradigm using video games. 
 Cyberpsychology, Behavior and Social Networking. 13, 711-714.  
 doi:10.1089/cyber.2009.0310. 
Labuhn, A. S., Wagner, U., van Dick, R., & Christ, O. (2004). Determinanten
 zivilcouragierten Verhaltens: Ergebnisse einer Fragebogenstudie. Zeitschrift für
 Sozialpsychologie, 35, 93-103. 
Laham, S. M., Gonsalkorale, K., & von Hippel, W. (2005). Darwinian grandparenting: 
 Preferential investment in more certain kin. Personality and Social Psychology 
 Bulletin, 31(1), 63-72. doi: 10.1177/0146167204271318 
Latané, B., & Darley, J. M. (1970). The unresponsive bystander: Why doesn’t he help? 
 New York, NY: Appleton-Century-Croft. 
Latané, B., & Nida, S. (1981). Ten years of research on group size and Helping. 
 Psychological Bulletin 89, 308-324. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.89.2.308 
Latané, B., & Rodin, J. (1969). Bystander „apathy“. American Scientist, 57, 244-268. 
References  122 
Levine, M. (1999). Rethinking bystander nonintervention: Social categorization and the 
 evidence of witnesses at the James Bulger murder trial. Human Relations, 52(9), 
 1133-1155. doi: 10.1177/001872679905200902 
Levine, M., Cassidy, C., Brazier, G., & Reicher, S. (2002). Self-categorization and 
 bystander intervention: Two experimental studies. Journal of Applied Social 
 Psychology, 7, 1452- 1463. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2002.tb01446.x 
Levine, M., & Crowther, S. (2008). The Responsive Bystander: How social group 
 membership and group size can encourage as well as inhibit bystander intervention. 
 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(6), 1429-1439.  
 doi: 10.1037/a0012634 
Levine, M., Prosser, A., Evans, D., & Reicher, S. (2005). Identity and emergency 
 intervention:  How social group membership and inclusiveness of group 
 boundaries shape helping behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
 31(4), 443-453. doi: 10.1177/0146167204271651 
Levine, R. V., Norenzayan, A., & Philbrick, K. (2001). Cross-cultural differences in 
 helping strangers. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32, 543-560. 
Manning, R., Levine, M. & Collins, A. (2007). The Kitty Genovese Murder and the social 
 psychology of helping: The parable of the 38 witnesses. American Psychologist, 62,
 555-562. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.62.6.555 
McGovern, L. P., Ditzian, J. L., & Taylor, S. P. (1975). The effect of one positive 
 reinforcement on helping with cost. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 5(5),  
 421-423. 
McGuire, A. M. (1994). Helping behaviors in the natural environment: Dimensions and 
 correlates of helping. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20(1), 45-56.  
 doi: 10.1177/0146167294201004 
References  123 
Meyer, J. P., & Mulherin, A. (1980). From attribution to helping: An analysis of the 
 mediating effects of affect and expectancy. Journal of Personality and Social 
 Psychology, 39(2), 201-210. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.39.2.201 
Midlarsky, E., & Midlarsky, M. (1973). Some determinants of aiding under 
 experimentally‐induced stress. Journal of Personality, 41(2), 305-327.  
 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.1973.tb00096.x 
Minkov, M., & Hofstede, G. (2012). Is national culture a meaningful concept? Cultural 
 values  delineate homogeneous national clusters of in-country regions. Cross-
 CulturalResearch, 46(2), 133-159. doi: 1069397111427262. 
Milgram, S. (1970). The Experience of Living in Cities. Science, 167, 1461-1468. 
Moghaddam, F. M., Taylor, D. M., & Wright, S. C. (1993). Social psychology in cross-
 cultural perspective. WH Freeman/Times Books/Henry Holt & Co. 
Mueller, C. W., & Donnerstein, E. (1981). Film-facilitated arousal and prosocial behavior. 
 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 17(1), 31-41.  
 doi: 10.1016/0022-1031(81)90004-4 
Mueller, C. W., Donnerstein, E., & Hallam, J. (1983). Violent films and prosocial 
 behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 9(1), 83-89.  
 doi: 10.1177/0146167283091011 
Nadler, A. (1991). Help-seeking behavior, psychological costs and instrumental benefits. 
 In M. S. Clark (Ed.), Review of personality and social psychology (Vol. 12, pp. 
 290–312). New York: Sage 
Nadler, A. (1997). Personality and help seeking: Autonomous versus dependent seeking of 
 help. In Sourcebook of social support and personality (pp. 379–407). New 
 York, NY: Plenum Press. 
References  124 
Nadler, A. (1998). Relationship, esteem, and achievement perspectives on autonomous and 
 dependent help seeking. In S. A. Karabenick (Ed.). Strategic help seeking: 
 Implications for learning and teaching. (pp. 61–93) Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence 
 Erlbaum Associates Publishers. 
Nadler, A. (2002). Inter-group helping relations as power relations: Maintaining or 
 challenging social dominance between groups through helping. Journal of Social 
 Issues, 58(3), 487–502. doi: 10.1111/1540-4560.00272 
Nadler, A., & Chernyak-Hai, L. (2014). Helping them stay where they are: Status effects 
 on dependency/autonomy-oriented helping. Journal of Personality and Social 
 Psychology, 106(1), 58-72. doi: 10.1037/a0034152 
Nadler, A., & Fisher, J. D. (1986). The role of threat to self-esteem and perceived control 
 in recipient reaction to help: Theory development and empirical validation. In L. 
 Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 81–121). New 
 York: Academic Press. 
Niesta Kayser, D., Greitemeyer. T., Fischer, P., & Frey, D. (2010). Why mood affects help 
 giving, but not moral courage: Comparing two types of prosocial behavior. 
 European Journal of Social Psychology, 40, 1136-1157. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.717 
Oppenheimer, D. M., Meyvis, T., & Davidenko, N. (2009). Instructional manipulation 
 checks: Detecting satisficing to increase statistical power. Journal of Experimental 
 Social  Psychology, 45(4), 867-872. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2009.03.009 
Penner, L. A., Dovidio, J. F., Piliavin, J. A., & Schroeder, D. A. (2005).Prosocial behavior: 
 Multilevel perspectives. Annual Review of Psychology, 56, 365-392.   
 doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070141 
Peterson, M. F., & Smith, P. B. (2008). Social structures and processes in crosscultural
 management. In P. B. Smith, M. F. Peterson, & D. C. Thomas (Eds.), The 
References  125 
 handbook of  cross-cultural management research (pp. 35-58). Thousand Oaks,
 CA: SAGE. 
Piliavin, I. M., Rodin, J., & Piliavin, J. A. (1969). Good samaritanism: an underground 
 phenomenon?. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 13(4), 289-299. 
 doi: 10.1037/h0028433 
Piliavin, J. A., Dovidio, J., Gaertner, S., & Clark, R. D., III. (1981). Emergency 
 intervention. New York, NY: Academic Press. 
Piliavin, J. A., & Piliavin, I. M. (1972). Effect of blood on reactions to a victim. Journal of 
 Personality and Social Psychology, 23(3), 353-361. doi: 10.1037/h0033166 
Plötner, M., Over, H., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2015). Young children show the 
 bystander effect in helping situations. Psychological Science, 26(4), 499-506. 
 doi: 10.1177/0956797615569579 
Reisenzein, R. (1986). A structural equation analysis of Weiner's attribution-affect model 
 of helping behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50(6),  
 1123-1133. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.50.6.1123 
Scarr, S. (1997). Behavior-genetic and socialization theories of intelligence: Truce and 
 reconciliation. In R. J. Sternberg & E. Grigorenko (Eds.), Intelligence, heredity, 
 and environment (pp. 3–41). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
Schwartz, S. H., & Gottlieb, A. (1976). Bystander reactions to a violent theft: Crime in 
 Jerusalem. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 1188–1199.  
 doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.34.6.1188 
Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Beyond individualism/collectivism: New cultural dimensions of 
 values. In U. Kim, H. C. Triandis, C. Kagitcibasi, S.- C. Choi, & G. Yoon (Eds.), 
 Individualism  and collectivism: Theory, method, and applications (pp. 85-122). 
 Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
References  126 
Schwartz, S. H. (2008). Cultural value orientations: Nature and implications of national 
 differences. Moscow: State University Higher School of Economics Press. 
Simner, M. L. (1971). Newborn's response to the cry of another infant. Developmental 
 Psychology, 5(1), 136-150. doi: 10.1037/h0031066 
Sleed, M., Durrheim, K., Kriel, A., Solomon, V., & Baxter, V. (2002). The effectiveness of 
 the vignette methodology: A comparison of written and video vignettes in eliciting 
 responses about date rapes. South African Journal of Psychology, 32, 21–28. 
Snyder, M., Omoto, A. M., & Crain, A. L. (1999). Punished for their Good Deeds 
 Stigmatization of AIDS Volunteers. American Behavioral Scientist, 42(7),  
 1175-1192. doi: 10.1177/0002764299042007009 
Solomon, H., & Herman, L. (1977). Status symbols and prosocial behavior: The effect of 
 the victim's car on helping. The Journal of Psychology, 97(2), 271-273.  
 doi: 10.1080/00223980.1977.9923973 
Srivastava, A., Bartol, K. M., & Locke, E. A. (2006). Empowering leadership in 
 management teams: Effects on knowledge sharing, efficacy, and performance. 
 Academy of Management Journal, 49(6), 1239-1251.  
 doi: 10.5465/AMJ.2006.23478718 
Sterling, B., & Gaertner, S. L. (1984). The attribution of arousal and emergency helping: A 
 bidirectional process. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 20(6), 586-596. 
 doi: 10.1016/0022-1031(84)90045-3 
Tajfel, H. (1978). Differentiation Between Social Groups. London: Academic Press 
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. C. (1987). 
 Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. New York: Basil 
 Blackwell. 
References  127 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. 
 Austin, & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33-
 47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity: Theory of intergroup behavior. In 
 S.Worchel, & W. G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 7-24), 
 Chicago: Nelson. 
Taras, V., Sarala, R., Muchinsky, P., Kemmelmeier, M., Singelis, T. M., Avsec, A., ... & 
 Sinclair, H. C. (2014). Opposite ends of the same stick? Multi-method test of the 
 dimensionality of individualism and collectivism. Journal of Cross-Cultural 
 Psychology, 45(2), 213-245. doi: 10.1177/0022022113509132 
van Bommel, M., van Prooijen, J. W., Elffers, H., & Van Lange, P. A. (2012). Be aware to 
 care: Public self-awareness leads to a reversal of the bystander effect. Journal of 
 Experimental Social Psychology, 48(4), 926-930. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2012.02.011 
Vaughan, K. B., & Lanzetta, J. T. (1980). Vicarious instigation and conditioning of facial 
 expressive and autonomic responses to a model's expressive display of pain. 
 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38(6), 909-923.  
 doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.38.6.909 
Weiner, B. (1980). May I borrow your class notes? An attributional analysis of judgments 
 of help giving in an achievement-related context. Journal of Educational 
 Psychology, 72(5), 676-681. doi: 10.1037/0022-0663.72.5.676 
Weiner, B. (1996). Searching for order in social motivation. Psychological Inquiry, 7(3), 
 199-216. doi: 10.1207/s15327965pli0703_1 
Wilson, D. W., & Kahn, A. (1975). Rewards, costs, and sex differences in helping 
 behavior. Psychological Reports, 36(1), 31-34. 
References  128 
Zucker, G. S., & Weiner, B. (1993). Conservatism and Perceptions of Poverty: An 
 Attributional Analysis. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 23(12), 925-943. 
  doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1993.tb01014.x 
 
 
 
  129 
 
Appendix A 
  
Appendix A   130 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A   131 
 
 
 
 
  132 
Appendix B 
  
Appendix B   133 
 
 
 
Appendix B   134 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B   135 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B   136 
 
 
  
Appendix B   137 
 
 
 
 
 
